

100

(Sgd.) 28
Date 2 / 11 / 76

DEPT.
or POST

201 - 295
(Part C)

TITLE: ARMS SALES FROM UK TO IRAQ

DO NOT RETURN PAPERS UNNECESSARILY
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REFER TO			REFER TO			REFER TO		
NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE	NAME (and dept. when necessary)	TO SEE:	DATE
<div style="transform: rotate(-45deg); font-size: 2em; font-weight: bold;"> FCO 8/2323 </div>						W418		
						<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; text-align: center;"> CLOSED UNTIL 2005 </div>		
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Registry Address

3906/04

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YEAR STAMP


1974

HPW 14



10/3

P R H Wright Esq
Middle East Department
F C O



BRITISH EMBASSY
BAGHDAD

12 November 1974

E+LA.

(201)

Mr. Chisholm 19/11
Mr. Butler 19/11
Mr. R. Jones 19/11

I am Mr. Butler a reply to him - Encl. on 54.

Dear Patrick,

DEFENCE SALES: BL 755 CLUSTER BOMB

1. Thank you very much for the prompt reply in FCO Tel No 291 to Baghdad.
2. I delivered the answer contained in FCO Tel No 287 to the Acting Director-General of the Political Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs this morning. I originally had an appointment with the Under-Secretary, Muhammad Sabri al Hadithi, but with the appointment of the new Foreign Minister this was cancelled and I thought it better to go ahead with the Political Director.
3. I said that we had taken some time to identify the exact piece of equipment the Iraqi Air Force wanted but, having done so, I was sorry to have to tell him that it was a type of equipment that we were not prepared to supply to countries involved in the Middle East area, involved in the Middle East problem. I hoped that the Iraqi Government would not read into this decision a lack of goodwill: HM Government had recently approved the supply to Iraq of bridging equipment, aluminium runways, artillery range sounding systems and night vision units for armoured vehicles. The Acting Political-Director took note but made no comment.
4. I can readily understand the reasons that would lead you to approve the sale of cluster bombs to Iran - CENTO ally and all that - but I hope nobody is under any illusion that if fragments of cluster bombs turn up in the next exhibition of arms captured in the North, the Iraqi Government will not take it very much amiss.

Yours ever
John

J A N Graham

CONFIDENTIAL

RR MODUK

GPS 60

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 160505Z NOV

RESTRICTED

TO ROUTINE MODUK TELNO 160505Z NOV.

DIG EBK/EBR

FOR SALES 1B AND SALES SUPPLY 1C.

SPARE PARTS FOR 25 POUNDER GUN.

ONE. IRAQIS HAVE ASKED FOR A COMPLETE RANGE OF SPARE PARTS FOR 25 POUNDER GUNS SUPPLIED TO THEM BY US.

TWO. THEY WILL NOT PRODUCE DETAILS BUT HAVE ASKED ME TO MAKE PRELIMINARY ENQUIRIES TO SEE WHAT IS AVAILABLE AND FIND OUT WHETHER WE WILL SUPPLY.

GRAHAM

BT

I have told Sales 1b that we must be consulted through the Arms Sales Working Party before an answer goes on this.

E.H.A.

20/11

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY NO 35

20 NOV 1974

NBR

10/11

0936

PRIMER

MOD DISTRIBUTION

Mr. Bygones

NNNN

FO 787/18

E 32/18

LKS 322/18

RR MODUK

GRS 90

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 180615Z NOV

RESTRICTED

TO ROUTINE MODUK TELNO 180540Z NOVEMBER.

DIG OYW

FROM DA FOR DEFENCE SALES 1.

VISIT OF DIR OF AIR SUPPLY IAF TO WESTLANDS.

MY EDB 120545Z NOV REFERS.
PLEASE PASS TO WESTLANDS.

1. COL KHATAN AZZAWI D.A.S.I.A.F. WILL NOW ARRIVE LAMP HATHROW
29 NOV 2045HRS ON 1A043 WITH 8 AIR FORCE OFFICERS. INTENDS
STAYING 10 DAYS AND HOPES ALSO TO SEE HAWKER SIDDELY ABOUT
HAWK TRAINER AND ROLLS ROYCE.

2. CAN OFFICERS BE MET AND ACCOMMODATION ARRANGED.

3. NOMINAL ROLL OF OFFICERS WILL FOLLOW.

4. ETA DELAYED DUE TO CHANGED IRAQI AIR SCHEDULES AND OTHER
PROBLEMS.

GRAHAM

MOD DISTRIBUTION

MED

Mr. Burtin

E+PA. 20/11

203
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
19 NOV 1974
NBR 10/1

H 384E



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation


Stuart House 23 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ

Telex 23805

Telephone 01-437 9288 ext.

Mr. Burt 18/11 (204)
Mr. Ruffley o.r. 12/11
This provides the answer for Baghdad.
18/11

T J Clark Esq.
 Middle East Department
 Foreign and Commonwealth Office



Your reference

Our reference D/Sales/113/48/1

Date 15 November 1974

Dear Mr Clark

When we spoke together recently about the sale of Cymbeline to Iraq we were, you will remember, concerned somehow to reply as favourably as possible to the Iraqis on the delivery date for this equipment. The Ministry of Defence could not accept an export date earlier than December 1975 but if we had to tell the Iraqis this baldly there was more than an even chance that they would be disappointed and withdraw from the contract. We hoped that by providing a British Army training course we could keep to the earlier delivery date which EMI could manage but could delay the export of the equipment from the UK until December. The Iraqis' Cymbeline would be required for the training course and if therefore they accepted the equipment and the training course as a package the Cymbeline could be delivered ex factory in October, but would be required to remain in the UK for the training course until December.

You will now have seen a copy of Army Training's minute A/43/0'seas/2533 AT7(F & C) dated 8 November in which agreement is given to the provision of this training by the British to the required timescale.

There was one other possible problem which we also discussed. The EMI contract calls for the provision of an Export Licence as a condition of the contract and its payments going forward. But Export Licences do not specify dates in the future by which deliveries can be effected and if the Export Licence has to be delayed until December the Iraqis within the terms of their contract could pull out of the deal. I suggest the easiest way through this problem is for Defence Sales to write to EMI forbidding export until December and for the Export Licence to be issued against that background.

I am not sure how you will wish to pursue this matter with the Iraqis but I have drafted in the annex to this letter the kind of wording which might be appropriate. Perhaps you could discuss with my section and once we have agreed we could clear quickly with the firm.

Yours sincerely

I S McDonald

I S McDONALD

(Agent on duty)

If this is acceptable to DoT I don't see why we should object. As far as I know has checked this point with Sales. Apparently DoT do not mind doing this.

We have as you asked been examining the delivery position for the Cymbeline equipments which the Iraq authorities have agreed to purchase from EMI.

I am happy to be able to tell you that after discussions with EMI and the British Army we are able to offer a suitable British Army Cymbeline conversion course for six Iraqis. This will follow immediately after the equipment can be delivered from the company. The Iraqi Cymbeline equipment will be used for this instruction and will therefore be available for export from the UK only after the course, which will last two months, is finished in December 1975. Earlier export of the equipment would not be feasible.

The six Iraqi students for the conversion course should be up to the following starting standard.

- a. a knowledge of mathematics, logarithms, map reading and survey up to the standard of Regimental Surveyor Class 3;
- b. very good English
- c. ability to operate a radio.

We would also suggest that the students should ideally comprise one officer and five senior NCOs who would be potential instructors.

We believe that the training course will provide your Army with the experience and expertise to use the equipment to its best advantage in Iraq and to provide a nucleus of men who can act as trainers in Iraq. The Ministry of Defence will be getting directly in touch to provide additional details of the arrangements for the course and the cost of this training.

EMI will probably ask you to amend article 2 of the contract so that the property in the equipment will pass to you when the course starts but we understand they are willing to prepare it for shipment to Iraq in December in accordance with the contract.


CONFIDENTIAL

(25)

D/DIS/5/5/12

DS 13b

Copy to:
Head DS 13
FCO (MED)/
FCO (Defense Dept)



IRAQ: SALE OF DEFENCE EQUIPMENT.

Ref A: D/DS 13/178/38 of 24.10.74

B: D/DS 13/178/38 of 28.10.74

1. In the view of the DIS, the sale of the equipments listed at reference (30 Gazelles and 40 Lynx helicopters, and 5 Combat Engineer Tractors) would not significantly increase Iraq's capabilities in any future conflict with Israel.

A.N. Clagge
J CUNNINGHAM
DI(AG) 4

15 Nov 74

CONFIDENTIAL

PP FCO


MODUK

GRS 130/2

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 180500Z NOV

C O N F I D E N T I A L



ADVANCE COPY

Mc Burton

(206)
Hd MED.

N. RAFTERY

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 424 OF 18 NOVEMBER INFO ROUTINE MODUK
(FOR SALES 1).

YOUR TELNO 254 : CYMBELINE

1. DEFENCE ATTACHE WAS SUMMONED BY DIRECTOR OF ARMAMENTS AND SUPPLIES, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, ON 14 OCTOBER, WHO SAID, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF, THAT IRAQIS WERE STILL AWAITING NEWS OF CYMBELINE DELIVERY DATE. DIRECTOR SAID CGS COULD NOT UNDERSTAND REASONS FOR DELAY ADDING "WE ARE NOT ASKING FOR AN ATOMIC BOMB".

2. DIRECTOR SAID, AS WE KNOW, THAT CONTRACT IS VALID UNTIL 31 DECEMBER, AFTER WHICH PRICES ARE SUBJECT TO RENEGOTIATION AND, IF NOT AGREED WITHIN 2 MONTHS, IS NULL AND VOID. CGS REQUIRED EARLY DELIVERY OF 2 UNITS IN ORDER THAT TRAINING CAN START.

3. IRAQIS ARE BECOMING IMPATIENT. I SHOULD BE GLAD TO LEARN WHEN INSTRUCTIONS FORESEEN IN YOUR TUR MAY BE EXPECTED.

GRAHAM

207

NNNNN



CONFIDENTIAL



British Embassy
Jedda

10/36

27 October 1974

P K Williams Esq
Middle East Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
LONDON SW1

Dear Sir,

Mr Young
Mr Kington
Mr Clark
Mr Wright
Mr Williams
Mr R. Smith
18.11

ARMS FOR IRAQ

1 Thank you for copying to us FCO telegram No 428 to Tehran of 22 October about arms sales to Iraq.

2 Although the supply to the Iraqis of night-vision units might be expected to be a sensitive item vis-a-vis the Saudis as well as the Iranians, I do not propose to seek authority to sound the Saudis about it. We do not want to manoeuvre ourselves into a position in which the Saudis expect us to consult them before we sell anything of military value to Iraq.

3 If later on the Saudis complain to us we shall use the Shah's argument that if the Iraqis did not buy from us they would buy from elsewhere (Tehran telegram to the FCO NO 568 of 24 October).

4 We should be grateful if you would keep us informed of any major developments in the field of arms sales to Iraq so that we can judge when if ever we should talk to the Saudis and when if ever they might be about to complain to us.

on telegram have been copied to Jedda and we will do some talking to do this in future.

Yours etc,

H B Walker

H B Walker

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

NBR 10/11

(209)

in brief
in brief

*Why not if we can supply
to eg. Kuwait? now
30.*

GR 35
IMMEDIATE
CYPHER CAT A

FM FCO 111615Z

(NBR 10/)

CONFIDENTIAL

(94)

TO IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TELNO 291 OF 11 NOVEMBER 1974
YOUR TELNO 413: BL 755 CLUSTER BOMB

1. THIS IS NOT THE CASE. STRICTLY FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION,
WE WOULD EXPECT TO HAVE NO OBJECTIONS TO SUPPLYING IRAN WITH
THIS WEAPON, BUT TO DATE THE IRANIANS HAVE DONE NO MORE THAN
EXPRESS INTEREST IN IT

CALLAGHAN

FILES

MED
DEF D
NENAD
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR
SIR G ARTHUR
MR THOMSON

COPIES TO

DS13
DIRECTOR SALES 1 } MOD
DIRECTOR SALES 4 }

CONFIDENTIAL

(210)

VZCZC DFA085DSAO-T-RR RBDA BAGHDAD

-T-RR FCO MED

DE RBDWC 0490 3231730.

ROUTINE 191405Z NOV

FM MODUK

TO BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD

INFO FCO MED

BT

C O N F I D E N T I A L

DIG EBR/LPE

FROM SALES 1B

Q. RE YOUR 130445Z NOV IRAQ NAVY.


A. WOULD PREFER TO WAIT FOR YOUR LETTER (YOUR 120545Z REFERS) L
AND CONSIDER IN DETAIL BEFORE INVOLVING FIRMS.

B. AS MANY ITEMS IN CATALOGUE COULD NOT BE SUPPLIED TO IRAQIS, WE
AND FCO WOULD PREFER TO WITHOLD CAT FROM THEM IN ORDER TO
AVOID AROUSING THEIR INTEREST IN THE MORE CONTENTIOUS EQUIPMENTS.

2. RE YOUR 170645 Z NOV ATC EQUIPMENT. CONSULTING DEPTS OF TRADE
AND INDUSTRY WHO MAY BE ABLE TO SET UP SOMETHING. WILL ADVISE YOU
FURTHER IN DUE COURSE.

BT

C WA AVOID AROUSING



807/19

DEFENCE DEPT

NO DISTRIBUTION

(M20)

Mr. R. A. T. 10/11

E. 1A 12/11

NNNN

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 130/2
PRIORITY
CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 180500Z NOV

C O N F I D E N T I A L



E + LA (211)
L 21/11
TOP COPY

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 424 OF 18 NOVEMBER⁷⁴ INFO ROUTINE MODUK
(FOR SALES 1).

YOUR TELNO 254 : CYMBELINE

(147)
1. DEFENCE ATTACHE WAS SUMMONED BY DIRECTOR OF ARMAMENTS AND SUPPLIES, MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, ON 14 ~~OCTOBER~~^{NOV}, WHO SAID, ON INSTRUCTIONS FROM CHIEF OF GENERAL STAFF, THAT IRAQIS WERE STILL AWAITING NEWS OF CYMBELINE DELIVERY DATE. DIRECTOR SAID CGS COULD NOT UNDERSTAND REASONS FOR DELAY ADDING "WE ARE NOT ASKING FOR AN ATOMIC BOMB".

2. DIRECTOR SAID, AS WE KNOW, THAT CONTRACT IS VALID UNTIL 31 DECEMBER, AFTER WHICH PRICES ARE SUBJECT TO RENEGOTIATION AND, IF NOT AGREED WITHIN 2 MONTHS, IS NULL AND VOID. CGS REQUIRED EARLY DELIVERY OF 2 UNITS IN ORDER THAT TRAINING CAN START.

3. IRAQIS ARE BECOMING IMPATIENT. I SHOULD BE GLAD TO LEARN WHEN INSTRUCTIONS FORESEEN IN YOUR TUR MAY BE EXPECTED.

GRAHAM

[SENT TO D C C]

F I L E S
MED
DEFENCE D
MR WEIR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PR (MF)

① leg
② cc MF
New
TLE

21/8

W B Lello Esq
British Embassy
BEIRUT



BRITISH EMBASSY

BAGHDAD


18 November 1974

179

(212)

E+1A.

(27/11)



162

TRISTAR: IRAQ

1. Please refer to your letter 21/30: 21/5 dated 1 November about Lockheed's interests in Iraq.
2. In the fifth paragraph of your letter you refer to Lockheed's efforts to satisfy the Iraqis' immediate interests with the C5A. It was our understanding that they were offering to supply the L100.
3. The Director of Air Supply recently told the Defence Attache that the IAF wanted a wide-bodied air transport aircraft, but was not to be drawn further.
4. I am copying this letter to the recipients of yours.

N W Lomas

cc: C J Farrow Esq,
Air Division
Department of Industry
LONDON SW1

cc: Science and Technology Dept.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office ✓

cc: Marine and Transport Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

cc: Department of Trade (CA2-2B)

CONFIDENTIAL

GR 370

28 NOV 74
(NBR 10/1)

(213)

CYPHER/CAT A

FM FCO 211115Z

1A 8-27-11

COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD TELNO 304 OF 21 NOVEMBER 74.

YOUR TELNO 424: CYMBELINE

1. WE REGRET THE DELAY IN ANSWERING BUT WE HAVE BEEN SEEKING WAYS OF RECONCILING THE IRAQIS' REQUEST FOR EARLIER DELIVERY WITH OUR OWN SECURITY REQUIREMENTS.
2. FOLLOWING THE REVIEW REFERRED TO IN OUR TELNO 254, IT HAS NOW BEEN AGREED THAT THE EARLIEST DATE WHEN CYMBELINE CAN BE EXPORTED TO IRAQ IS DECEMBER 1975. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE INFORM THE IRAQIS THAT CYMBELINE WILL BE AVAILABLE TO THEM FOR DESPATCH TO IRAQ AT THAT DATE. TO SUGAR THE PILL, YOU SHOULD GO ON TO OFFER TO ARRANGE (AT THEIR EXPENSE) A SPECIAL TWO MONTHS' COURSE FOR 6 MEN TO BE RUN BY THE BRITISH ARMY IN THE UK BEGINNING IN OCTOBER 1975. THUS EMI WOULD IN FACT DELIVER CYMBELINE TO THE IRAQIS IN OCTOBER IN THIS COUNTRY FOR USE BY THEIR TRAINEES AND SUBSEQUENT EXPORT AT THE END OF THE COURSE.
3. THE 6 TRAINEES SHOULD COMPRISE ONE OFFICER AND 5 SENIOR NON-COMMISSIONED OFFICERS, ALL OF WHOM SHOULD HAVE FLUENT ENGLISH AND PREVIOUS SIGNALS EXPERIENCE IN ADDITION TO A KNOWLEDGE OF MATHEMATICS, LOGARITHMS, MAP READING AND SURVEY UP TO THE BRITISH ARMY STANDARD OF REGIMENTAL SURVEYOR CLASS 3.
4. IF THEY EXPRESS DISAPPOINTMENT OVER THE DELAY IN DELIVERY, YOU SHOULD STRESS THE BENEFITS TO THEM OF HAVING A TEAM OF BRITISH TRAINED OPERATORS AVAILABLE TO ACCOMPANY THE FIRST DELIVERY OF CYMBELINE UNITS TO IRAQ WHO WILL PROVIDE THE IRAQI ARMY WITH THE EXPERIENCE AND EXPERTISE NECESSARY TO MAINTAIN THE EQUIPMENT IN SERVICE AS WELL AS A NUCLEUS OF INSTRUCTING STAFF. YOU MAY ADD THAT HMG ARE READY TO ISSUE EMI WITH AN EXPORT LICENCE IMMEDIATELY SO THAT THE CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE COMPLETED.

5. IF THE IRAQIS ASK WHETHER TRAINING CAN BE STARTED IN UK BEFORE OCTOBER YOU SHOULD EXPLAIN THAT THE BRITISH ARMY ARE FULLY COMMITTED TO TRAINING OUR OWN SOLDIERS ON CYMBELINE UNTIL THEN. IF THEY SHOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS FOR DELIVERY OF CYMBELINE TO IRAQ BEFORE DECEMBER 1975 YOU WILL HAVE TO SAY THAT THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR SECURITY REASONS.

CALLAGHAN

FILES
MED
DEFENCE DEPT
PS/MR ENNALS
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR
MR THOMSON
SIR G ARTHUR

COPIES TO:

DS 13 MOD
MOD SALES 1B

REC 1 CONFIDENTIAL
REC 1
28 NOV
NBR 10/1
has well com

BL 755 CLUSTER BOMB

A

B

9/12/71
please send a photograph to his
detention, Welfare Dept. (26/11)

[Signature]

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Rafferty
MED

cc Mr Muir
NENAD
WED, N AM D

REC'D REG'D 28 NOV 1974 NBR 10/1

BW. in two weeks.

127/11

EXPORT LICENCE APPLICATIONS SUBMITTED BY COGSWELL AND HARRISON LTD

I mentioned to you on Friday that I had received in the normal way an export licence application submitted by Cogswell and Harrison Ltd in respect of a consignment of 30,000 M16 Rifles for the Government of Iraq. The Overseas Consignee is given as the US Government. There is also another application submitted by the same firm in respect of a consignment of 50 Leopard Tanks to the Libyan Government. In this case the consignee is given as the West German Government.

2. Cogswell and Harrison is owned by the major private arms-dealing firm Interarms (UK) although C & H is usually only involved in the retail trade in personal weapons. Certainly there is no evidence to suggest that Interarms would seek to evade arms sales policies imposed by governments but these two applications seem on the face of it to be open to question and to be a new kind of venture for C & H. I have therefore asked Miss Kavanagh in Export Licensing Branch to establish more of the background to these two cases. In particular I think we need to be assured that the two governments supplying ^{the equipment} are aware of the final destinations for these items. ~~of equipment.~~

Miss M R McIntosh
MISS M R McINTOSH
Defence Department

25 November 1974

Mr. Smith 26/11
Mr. Williams 26/11
Mr. G. J. 26/11

Once we get the answer from DoS we will have to consider in conjunction with NENAD how to handle this one.

CONFIDENTIAL

I have
26/11



DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY

Export Licensing Branch

Sanctuary Buildings

16-20 Great Smith Street London SW1P 3DB

Telephone 01-222 7877 ext

11 01-216 4237/8

15/11

Subs

Your reference

Our reference *A/ST/10/74*

Date

IRA Q

Attached is a copy of particulars of an application to export goods controlled under legislation at present in force.

Is there any objection to the issue of a licence in this case please:

Signed W. KAVANAGH (MISS)

Date 21 NOV 1974

Referred to:-

~~Foreign & Commonwealth Office~~
~~Ministry of Defence (DS8A)~~
~~Ministry of Defence (DS13)~~
~~Ministry of Defence (DIS)~~
~~Ministry of Aviation (Supply)~~
Department of Trade & Industry

Very odd. I have asked KTB to get Mrs K to bring in Monday about this

MRH

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 27 25 NOV 1974 DP123/14.
--

sep

G.6

11/5/10/74

ELH/DJR/1

CONSIGNOR

Cogswell & Harrison Ltd;

168, Piccadilly, London W.1.

DESTINATION

Iraq.

CONSIGNEE Government of Iraq.

GOODS

M16 Rifles.

Exporting
Country

U.S.A.

QTY

30,000

U.S.A.

ELH/DJR/1

UK
CONSIGNOR

Cogswell & Harrison Ltd;
168, Piccadilly, London W.1.

OVERSEAS
CONSIGNOR

United States Government.

New York, U.S.A.

U.S.A.

Yes.

the exporter

CS60/67

Export Manager.

14 November 1974.



DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY

Export Licensing Branch

Sanctuary Buildings

16-20 Great Smith Street London SW1P 3DB

Telephone 01-222-7877 ext

u 01-215 4237/8

Intodn

Your reference

Our reference *1A/ST/9/74*

Date

(15)

LIBYA

Attached is a copy of particulars of an application to export goods controlled under legislation at present in force.

Is there any objection to the issue of a licence in this case please:

Signed W. KAVANAGH (MISS)

Date 21 NOV 1974

Referred to:-

~~Foreign & Commonwealth Office~~
~~Ministry of Defence (DS8A)~~
~~Ministry of Defence (DS13)~~
~~Ministry of Defence (DIS)~~
~~Ministry of Aviation (Supply)~~
Department of Trade & Industry

*Very odd. I have
asked to be kept
this H being, a
Monday as well tho.*

*MPL
22/11*

F-60

G.6

11/5/74

ELH/DJR/2.

Consignor

Cogswell & Harrison Ltd;

168, Piccadilly, London W.1.

Destination

Tripoli, Libya.

Consignee

Government of Libya.

Goods

Leopard Tanks.

Exporting
Country

W. Germany.

Qty

50 (FIFTY)

ELB Note

P.T.O.

Please see the end use certificate
issued by the Libyan Embassy in Paris

ELH/DJR/2

V K. Conlinski

Cogswell & Harrison Ltd;
168, Piccadilly, London W1V OHQ.

Government of West Germany.

Frankfurt, W. Germany.

W. Germany.

Yes.

the exporter.

CS60/67.

Export Manager.

14 November 1974.



AMBASSADE
DE LA
REPUBLIQUE ARABE LIBYENNE
(BUREAU D'ACHAT)
18, RUE KEPPLER - 75016 PARIS

1A/ST/9/74

سفارة
الجمهورية العربية الليبية
مكتب المشتريات
باريس

١٣

١٩

/ /

التاريخ
الموافق
ملف الرقم

Paris le 3.9.1974.

THE LIBYAN ARMED FORCES

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

This is to certify that the following
equipments bought through license
are for the use
of THE LIBYAN ARMED FORCES only and not to be sold to any
other country.

accesories. Qty 200 tanks with its associated


MUFTAH DAKHIL
DIRECTOR.



GRS 450
PRIORITY
CYPHER CAT A
FM BAGHDAD 260600Z
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

COPY



TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 445 OF 26 NOVEMBER¹⁹⁷⁴ AND TO SAVING TEHRAN
AND KUWAIT.

YOUR TEL NO. 424 (NOT TO ALL) : CYMBELINE

I AM GRATEFUL FOR THESE INSTRUCTIONS. I HAD INTENDED TO LET THE DEFENCE ATTACHE, TO WHOM THE IRAQIS' RECENT APPROACHES HAVE BEEN DIRECTED, CONVEY THE REPLY ON HIS RETURN FROM THE NORTH, BUT I WAS SUMMONED YESTERDAY BY THE UNDER-SECRETARY IN THE MFA, HADITHI, IN ORDER TO RECEIVE A REMONSTRANCE. I THEREFORE TOLD HIM THAT THE LICENCE WAS BEING ISSUED, AND THAT DELIVERY WOULD BE IN DECEMBER 1975, WITH TRAINING TO START IN THE UK IN OCTOBER. ASKED IF THE DELAY WAS ATTRIBUTABLE SOLELY TO TECHNICAL AND MANUFACTURING REASONS, I JUDGED IT BEST TO SAY THAT PART OF THE DELAY WAS FOR SECURITY REASONS. I SAID THAT I BELIEVED IT RIGHT TO BE ABSOLUTELY FRANK WITH THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT OVER WHAT WE COULD AND COULD NOT SUPPLY, AND WHERE WE HAVE RESERVATIONS, TO DISCLOSE THEM.

Not strictly accurate: we are nearly to issue the licence in order to all the interested authorities to be complete

2. HADITHI RESPONDED WELL TO THIS BUT ASKED THE OBVIOUS QUESTION : WHY SECURITY OBJECTIONS WOULD LAPSE IN A YEAR'S TIME. I SAID THAT I HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS ON THIS BUT IN THE CASE OF ANY EQUIPMENT SECRECY WAS A DIMINISHING ASSET : WHEN IT WAS NEW, SECRECY ABOUT ITS CAPABILITY AND PERFORMANCE WAS ABSOLUTE, BUT AS IT WAS DEPLOYED, THESE QUALITIES BECAME MORE WIDELY KNOWN. IT WAS A MATTER OF JUDGMENT AT WHAT POINT TO DOWN-GRADE THE CLASSIFICATION OF A PIECE OF EQUIPMENT AND I PRESUMED THAT YOU HAD MADE A FORECAST IN THIS CASE, IN RESPONSE TO THE IRAQIS' PRESSURE AND BECAUSE THE CONTRACT HAD TO BE CONFIRMED BY THE END OF THE YEAR.

3. HADITHI PROMISED TO PASS ON OUR REPLY TO THE IRAQI MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND THE DEFENCE ATTACHE WILL FOLLOW IT UP. ||
FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TO KUWAIT AND TEHRAN.

GRAHAM

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FILES

MED

DEFENCE DEPT
MR CAMPBELL

MR WEIR
SIR G ARTHUR
MR THOMSON

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(217)



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

His Excellency
Mr A T Lamb CMG MBE DFC
KUWAIT

Your reference

Our reference

Date

REC
REC

28/11

NBR 10/1

27 November 1974

PA. 8/27/11

Dear Archie,

ARMS SALES TO IRAQ

(181)

1. Thank you for your letter of 5 November.
2. We shall certainly bear in mind the need to inform you once we know that the Cymbeline order is firm. At the moment we are awaiting the Iraqi reaction to a proposal which we hope will lead them to proceed with the contract.
3. On reflection, we think it preferable that you defer telling the Kuwaitis about the orders referred to in paragraph 2 of our telegram No 428 until we know definitely that contracts have been signed. So many of these arms sales enquiries come to nothing in the end that it seems pointless to bother the Kuwaitis unless we know for sure that an order is firm. We will keep you informed.

P R H Wright
Middle East Department

c.c.

Director Sales 1
Ministry of Defence

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Clark
Mr Jackson (Defence Dept)
Mr Weir
Sir G Arthur

(218)

REC'D
REGISTRY
28 NOV 1974
NBR 10/1


P.A. 4/12.

ARMS SALES TO IRAQ

1. Sir Geoffrey Arthur has asked Mr Jackson and myself to discuss the letter of 21 November from HM Ambassador Baghdad about arms sales to Iraq. I regret that I was not able to take any action on this before today and Sir Geoffrey Arthur's absence and my own imminent departure from this department means that I will not now have an opportunity to discuss this question personally with him.

about
Cymbeline/

2. I attach a useful minute by Mr Raftery commenting on some of the points in Mr Graham's letter and the enclosed letter from his Defence Attache to MOD Sales. Since receiving this correspondence, we have had Baghdad telegram No 451 asking whether we can obtain any relaxation of the security limitations on the export of this equipment. I hope very much that Sir Geoffrey Arthur might agree to support a further approach to the Ministry of Defence on this question (although our earlier approach supported by the Minister of State failed to achieve as much relaxation of the security rules as we had hoped). On the face of it, it is patently ridiculous that we should be debarred on security grounds alone from releasing Cymbeline to the Iraqis until more than a year after its release to the Egyptians.



P R H Wright
Middle East Department

28 November 1974

(229) ref?

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT A

Amesbury Q 28
New (219)

FM BAGHDAD 281015Z NOV

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY N-35
29 NOV 1974
NBR 10/i

TO IMMEDIATE FCO LONDON TELNO VISA 383 OF 28 NOVEMBER, 1974

YOUR VISA 428 : IRAQI AIR FORCE PERSONNEL

FOLLOWING FOR MALLETT. I HAVE TODAY ISSUED VISAS TO VAF 9255 TO 9263.

2. PARTY WILL TRAVEL BY IRAQI AIRWAYS FLIGHT NO. 043 29
NOVEMBER.

3. THESE NINE AIR FORCE OFFICERS, LED BY DIRECTOR OF AIR SUPPLY, HAVE BEEN SPECIFICALLY INVITED BY FOLLOWING FIRMS TO DISCUSS CONTRACTS :-

(A) WESTLANDS 30 GAZELLE HELICOPTERS, 40 LYNX

(B) H.S. HAWK £40 MILLION

(C) ROLLS ROYCE AIRCRAFT ENGINES

(D) BRIT LEYLAND LAND ROVERS.

4. SOME OF THESE CONTRACTS ARE IN COMPETITION WITH FRENCH. THE VISIT HAS ALREADY BEEN DELAYED ONE WEEK. COMMANDER IAF HAS PERSONALLY REQUESTED THAT VISIT SHOULD NOT BE FURTHER DELAYED.

GRAHAM

PASSPORT CONTROL DISTRIBUTION

**MVD
MED**

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Raftery
MCD

(220)

GUN SPARKS FOR IRAQI ARMY.

28

76

Sales Supply have asked if we can now reply to their letter D/Sales/523/10/12 of 2 April. (doc 98) This is an earlier but separate enquiry to their letter of 3 July (doc 76) which you were able to approve.

I should be grateful for your confirmation that supply of 5.5 & 25 cal. gun sparks is OK.

26. 11. 74.

Mr. Raftery.
Deputy Secy

Miss M. V. V.

Yes. This is minor equipment and it may be supplied.

L29/11

Letter to Mrs

29/11



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation

St Christopher House Southwark Street

Telephone 01-928 7999 ext

RECEIVED IN
London SE1N 35
36319 JUL 1974
MBR 10 1
Your reference

76

Miss M R McIntosh,
FCO Defence Department,
Downing Street,
SW1.

Our reference D/Sales/
523/10/12
Date 3 July, 1974

Miss McIntosh. This is minor equipment. No objection.

Dear Miss McIntosh,

We have received a request for the supply of 128.
25 Pdr. Gun Spares to the Iraqi Army.

May we please have your agreement to fulfil this
order, valued at £780 approx.

*wait another two
weeks.*

*Yours sincerely,
[Signature]*

Copy to:

*By 2 weeks
C 87*

*Enter into
for battery.*

Still pending Head of DS 13
MOD DS 13b
By 2 weeks MOD Defence Policy Staff
mba DTI (EPB)
17/8 Treasury (Defence Materiel Dept.)
Sales 1b

Any objections?

Have held pending a submission Defence Dept 17

in arms sales to Iraq in general.
MBL 24/7
CPD consideration expected next week 4/87
10/8/74



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation

St Christopher House Southwark Street London SE1

Telephone 01-928 7999 ext 3631

Enter into

28

Miss M R McIntosh,
FCO Defence Department
Downing Street,
London, SW1

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No. 27

2 APR 1974

Your reference

Our reference D/Sales/
523/10/12
Date 2nd April, 1974.

8 APR 1974

NR 10/1

Dear Miss McIntosh,

We have received an enquiry from the Government of
IRAQ for the supply of various 5.5 and 25 Pdr. gun spares
to the Iraqi Army. These spares will be provided from
Army stock.

Will you please say if there is any objection to the
sale of the spares, valued at £8,500, to Iraq.

Wait another two weeks

Yours sincerely,

Mr Raftery

I also think it should be delayed.

Copy to:

Head of DS 13

MOD DS 13b

MOD Defence Policy Staff

DTI (EPB)

Treasury (Defence Materiel Dept.)

Sales 1b

PR 8/4

in memo

8/4

Mr Raftery

Mr Raftery.

This is a minor sale. Any objections please?
But I suggest there are no objections.
delay has done the job. A minor sale. Please.
C. L. 3/4

CONFIDENTIAL

GRS 210

PRIORITY

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 270900Z NOV

CONFIDENTIAL

1974

TO PRIORITY FCO TELNO 451 OF 27 NOVEMBER/SAVING TEHRAN AND KUWAIT.

MYTEL NO 445 : CYMBELINE

1. I WAS INVITED TO CALL TODAY BY THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HAMMADI, ON WHOM I HAD NOT YET CALLED SINCE HE MOVED FROM THE MINISTRY OF OIL. HE MADE IT CLEAR AT ONCE THAT THIS WAS NOT MERELY A COURTESY FIRST CALL BY LAUNCHING STRAIGHT INTO A PLEA THAT HMG SHOULD RECONSIDER THE DELAY OVER THE SUPPLY OF CYMBELINE. THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES WERE IN URGENT NEED OF IT AND THE IRAQ GOVERNMENT WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF HMG COULD PERMIT SUPPLY SIX MONTHS EARLIER : INDEED ANY ACCELERATION WOULD BE WELCOMED. I UNDERTOOK TO REPORT THIS REQUEST AND TO CONVEY YOUR REPLY.

2. THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES WILL BE AWARE THAT THIS EQUIPMENT IS BEING SUPPLIED TO THE EGYPTIAN ARMY AND THIS OF COURSE MAKES OBJECTION ON SECURITY GROUNDS HARDER FOR THEM TO SWALLOW. THEY CLEARLY NEED THE EQUIPMENT FOR THEIR OWN USE AND ARE UNLIKELY TO PASS IT ON E.G. TO DHOFAR. I AM SORRY TO HAVE TO COME BACK TO YOU ON THIS BUT A GESTURE OF EVEN 3 MONTHS ACCELERATION WOULD , I THINK, BE WELL RECEIVED HERE.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ 3. IT WOULD

CONFIDENTIAL

3. IT WOULD HELP ME IN ARGUING THIS IF I COULD BE BRIEFED ON THE MANUFACTURING DELAY AND BE GIVEN SOME INDICATION OF THE SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS YOU HAVE IN MIND. IF THE WORRY IS THAT THE EQUIPMENT MIGHT BE PASSED ON, IT WOULD BE WORTH TRYING TO OBTAIN ASSURANCES FROM THE IRAQIS ABOUT THIS.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TEHRAN AND KUWAIT.

GRAHAM

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

FILES

MED
DEFENCE D
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR
SIR G ARTHUR
MR THOMSON

old
DS 139
(A. DAVIS)
9m9/12

- 2 -

CONFIDENTIAL

FG

NBR 10/1

ADVANCE COPY

222

VZCZC DFA003

DSAO-T-RR FCO MED

DE RBDWC 0581 3321745

IMMEDIATE ROUTINE 281530Z NOV

FM MODUK

TO BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD

INFO FCO MED

BT

UNCLAS

DIG EBR/LPE

FROM SALES 1B. WESTLANDS. RE YOUR 280930Z NOV. WESTLAND SAY RAQ
EMBASSY LONDON WILL BOOK HOTEL AND ARRANGE TO MEET VISITORS
WESTLAND HAVE ALREADY SIGNALLED DETAILS TO BAGHDAD BUT HAVE RECEIVED
NO REPLY. PROGRAMMED IS AS FOLLOWS-

FRIDAY 29 ARRIVAL AT HEATHROW 2045 MET BY EMBASSY AND TAKEN TO HOTEL.

SUNDAY 1 TRAIN FROM WATERLOO AT 1700 ARRIVES SHERBOURNE 1925. WILL

BE MET BY MR JEYES AND TAKEN TO POST HOUSE HOTEL. MONDAY 2 FO

THURSDAY 5 AT WESTLANDS YEOVIL. PM THURS BY CARS TO ANGEL HOTEL

GUILDFORD TO BE MET BY HSA.

FRIDAY 6 VISIT DUNSFOLD AND KINGSTON WITH HSA.

MON 9 WITH ROLLS ROYCE LEAVES DEN.

BT

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6x1A

Kd MED
Mr. Puffery
K29
Jag/11

1950

NNNN

(223)

Mr Clark
Mr Jackson (Defence Dept)
Mr Weir
Sir G Arthur

RECEIVED REGISTRY N 15 - 5 DEC 1974 NBR 10/1


IA. Lm

ARMS SALES TO IRAQ

1. Sir Geoffrey Arthur has asked Mr Jackson and myself to discuss the letter of 21 November from HM Ambassador Baghdad about arms sales to Iraq. I regret that I was not able to take any action on this before today and Sir Geoffrey Arthur's absence and my own imminent departure from this department means that I will not now have an opportunity to discuss this question personally with him.

2. I attach a useful minute by Mr Raftery commenting on some of the points in Mr Graham's letter and the enclosed letter from his Defence Attache to MOD Sales. Since receiving this correspondence, we have had Baghdad telegram No 451 asking whether we can obtain any relaxation of the security limitations on the export of this equipment. I hope very much that Sir Geoffrey Arthur might agree to support a further approach to the Ministry of Defence on this question (although our earlier approach supported by the Minister of State failed to achieve as much relaxation of the security rules as we had hoped). On the face of it, it is patently ridiculous that we should be debarred on security grounds alone from releasing Cymbeline to the Iraqis until more than a year after its release to the Egyptians.

about
Cymbeline/



P R H Wright
Middle East Department

28 November 1974

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

MBO


(224)

O OGUN ESQ
SALES SUPPLY 5b
DEFENCE SALES ORGANISATION
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
ST CHRISTOPHER HOUSE
SOUTHWARK STREET

Your reference

Our reference NBR 10/1

Date 29 November 1974



Dear Mr. Ogun,

IRAQ: GUN SPARES

1. I am sorry we have not replied earlier to your letter D/Sales/523/10/12 of 2 April 1974.
2. There is now no political objection to the supply of 5.5 and 25 Pdr gun spares to Iraq.
3. I am copying this letter to the other members of the Arms Working Party.

Yours sincerely

Miss M R McIntosh

Miss M R McIntosh
Defence Department

IA. L31

IA. Lmiv

(225)

FO 147/E031/02

LKS NR 450/01

RR MODUK

RR FCO

GRS 37

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 010730Z DEC.

R E S T R I C T E D

TO ROUTINE MODUK TEL OF 1 DECEMBER 1974, INFO ROUTINE FCO.

DIG EBK/EBR.

FOR SALES 1B AND 1C.


FROM DA.

SPARE PARTS FOR 25 POUNDER GUN. MY EBK/EBR 160505Z NOV REFERS.

1. MAY WE HAVE AN ANSWER.

GRAHAM

BT



TOP COPY

NO DISTRIBUTION

ME D

1A. R2/12

CYPHER

09292

NNNN

FO 223/E065/02

(226)

LWY 653/02

OO MODPE

GR 150

CYPHER CAT/A

FROM CAIRO 021020Z

SECRET

TO IMMEDIATE MODPE TEL NO 455 OF 020910Z DEC.

FOR SALES 1A FROM BRITDEFAT.

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING FROM SPEECHLEY TO HUDSON WESTLAND HELICOPTERS.



IRAQI DELEGATION DUE UK DECEMBER 2ND. YOU WILL BE UNDER PRESSURE TO QUOTE ON GAZELLE BUT DO NOT REPEAT NOT DO SO. HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT WITH MY FRIENDS FOR 10% BUT IF YOU QUOTE PRICES INCREASE THESE TO ALLOW A 15% OR 16% MARGIN FOR BARGAINING PURPOSES. EVIDENCE THAT FRENCH ARE DOING US DOWN IN IRAQ BY SUGGESTION THAT LYNX PRICES LOADED TO RECOMPENCE FOR BUDGETRY PRICES GIVEN BY OUR REPRESENTATIVE ON GAZELLE IN BAGHDAD. FRENCH PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER NOW VISITING IRAQ. BELIEVE BUSINESS POSSIBLE FOR 40 LYNX IF UK GOVERNMENT AGREE. GAZELLE SALE TO IRAQ CONFIRMED? SO WHY NOT QUID PRO QUO. LEAVE AZZAWI QUESTIONING UNTIL MY RETURN.

ADAMS

BT

Mr. Clark. reference X.

The explanation is that Hudson assumes that the French have secured an agreement for them to sell Gazelle to the Iraqis, so why shouldn't we seek a quid pro quo over Lynx? In fact, the French have not committed in at all over Gazelle. L. Hall 3/12



MED
Mixed

ETA
3/12

NNNN

VV

DFA011 03/0108 336A39645

FOR DFA

ROUTINE/ROUTINE 021133Z DEC

FROM MODUK
TO BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD
INFO FCO MED

CONFIDENTIAL
DIG EBR/LPE

FROM SALES 1B PD ENGINEER EQUIP PD ALPHA PD VISIT APPEARS
TO HAVE GONE OFF WELL PD COL ABDUL HEAD OF DELEGATION CMM TOOK
OPPORTUNITY TO SEEK AVAILABILITY OF WIDE RANGE OF ARMY EQUIPMENT
TO ASSIST IN OFFENSIVE AGAINST KURDS PD ITEMS RANGED FROM
BOOTS TO SCORPION PD WHERE WE KNEW ITEMS COULD BE SOLD CMM
EG CYMBELINE AND COMBAT ENG TRACTOR CMM WE TOLD HIM SO PD
WHERE ITEMS WERE NOT AVAILABLE BECAUSE EITHER OBSOLETE OR OF
FOREIGN ORIGIN HE WAS ALSO TOLD PD ON OTHER ITEMS WHERE POSITION
NOT CLEAR CUT HE WAS ADVISED TO ASK YOU ON HIS RETURN TO
BAGHDAD PD

BRAVO PD FOR YOUR INFO CMM IRAQIS HAVE SIGNED CONTRACT VALUE
NINE MILLION STERLING FOR 18 SETS(TOTAL 600 METRES) MGB EQUIPMENT
PLUS AXCELLARY EQUIPMENT AND SPARES PD
BT

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Burroughs 3/12
Mr. Kirtner 3/12
Mr. Clark 3/12
3/12

(227)
The first real contract though it is
conditional on the Iraqis making a
deposit in 15 days. I think we should
await final confirmation before
informing Kuwait + Tehran.

I. L. L. L.

ETA 3/12 16D

NO DISTRIBUTION

medium girder bridge

NNNN
VV

U N C L A S S I F I E D

2-1A

L3/10

(228)

~~DFA034 03/0301 337A0613~~

FCO
FOR BEA

RECEIVED REGISTRY NO 55	PRIORITY
-5DEC 1974	UP COPY
WBR 10/1	

MBD

PRIORITY/ROUTINE 021640Z DEC

FROM MODUK
TO BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD
INFO FCO MED

NO DISTRIBUTION

U N C L A S S I F I E D

DIG EBR/RNK/LPE

FROM SALES 1B ATC EQUIPMENT PD RE YOUR 301030Z NOV HAVE
AGREED PROVISIONAL PROGRAMMES WITH COMPANIES AS FOLLOWS OPD
13 DECEMBER WITH COSSOR AT HARLOW PD
16-17 DECEMBER WITH FERRANTI AT HURN AND BRACKNELL PD
18 DECEMBER WITH MARCONI AT STANMORE OR CHELMSFORD PD
19 DECEMBER WITH SOLARTRON AT FARNBOROUGH PD
20 DECEMBER WITH REDIFON AT CRAWLEY PD
23 DECEMBER WITH PLESSEY AT WEYBRIDGE PD
GRATEFUL YOU CONFIRM THIS OK SO WE CAN GO FIRM PD SUGGEST
YOU ADVISE IRAQIS TO BOOK LONDON ACCOMMODATION FOR 12 DEC
ONWARDS PD CAN YOU PLEASE GIVE ANY FURTHER GUIDANCE AS TO
WHAT MANUFACTURERS COULD USEFULLY TALK ABOUT
BT

0303²/3

Mr Weir ✓
Sir G Arthur ✓

RECEIVED IN MINISTRY No 35 - 5 DEC 1974 (229)
NBR P/1

CYMBELINE FOR IRAQ


- A (218)
1. In his minute of 28 November, Mr Wright expressed the hope that Sir Geoffrey Arthur might agree to support a further approach to the Ministry of Defence for a relaxation of the security limitations on the export of the Cymbeline mortar locating radar to Iraq.
 2. Originally the MOD security side were against the sale of Cymbeline to Iraq because the Russians would have access to the equipment (by learning the details of Cymbeline's electronic signal, the Russians could take counter measures to neutralise the Cymbelines in service with BAOR). After an appeal by MOD Sales, this attitude was modified by a restriction on delivery until late 1976. In October the late Iraqi Foreign Minister pressed us to assist over delivery delays and we informed MOD of our Ministers' view that on political grounds, they saw no reason against delivery to Iraq 9 months after the Egyptians had taken delivery (September 1974). As a result, MOD conceded that delivery could commence in December 1975 (ie 15 months after delivery to Egypt); subsequently they agreed to allow Cymbeline to be delivered to the Iraqis in the UK in October 1975 for training purposes. The Iraqis were informed of the December 1975 delivery date last month and their Foreign Minister has since appealed to HM Ambassador in Baghdad for an improvement of 6 months; Mr Graham has indicated that a gesture of even 3 months acceleration would be well received by the Iraqis.
 3. We have first attempted to establish whether the manufacturer (EMI) could in fact improve the present delivery date by 6 months. MOD Sales have said however that this cannot be established firmly at present because it will be affected by the decision on an order for South Africa, which is under review. However, they are reasonably sure that EMI would be able to improve on the December 1975 date for the Iraqis if this were allowed. Should we now press for a further relaxation of the security restrictions on political grounds?

/4.

- 2 -

4. This matter has been dragging on for months now and it seems likely that it could become a real source of political difficulty in Anglo/Iraqi relations. The Iraqis want to get the equipment into service as soon as possible and they have told us several times of the importance which they attach to our attitude on delivery. The latest approach by their Foreign Minister reinforces this point. We have therefore to weigh the security consideration of protecting Cymbeline from possible Russian examination by a few months against the political harm which we could risk by adhering to the present security restriction. Mr Graham has pointed out the difficulty of sustaining the security argument with the Iraqis in the face of their knowledge that the Egyptians already have Cymbeline (we can hardly tell the Iraqis that we trust the Egyptians but not them to keep Cymbeline from the Russians). In my view, the issue hinges on how important it is to maintain the security of Cymbeline. This is for the MOD to assess, but we have already taken a risk with it over Egypt and we accept that the Russians will have access to it via the Iraqis in December 1975.

5. I conclude therefore that it would be appropriate to ask the MOD to re-examine the security restrictions in the light of the representation from the Iraqi Foreign Minister and I attach a draft letter asking Sir Lester Suffield to take this up within the Ministry.



T J Clark
Middle East Department

3 December 1974

c.c.

Mr Coles
Defence Department

I agree. I can hardly believe that Egypt is officially regarded as 'more secure' than Iraq.

M. J. M. 3.12

4/12

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35

- 5 DEC 1974

NBR 10/1

Mr Weir

Mr Coles

HELICOPTERS FOR IRAQ

PROBLEM

- A 1. The Ministry of Defence have sought our views on the sale to Iraq of 40 Westland Lynx troop-carrying helicopters worth £20 m. and also 30 of the smaller Westland Gazelle general purpose helicopters. How should we respond?

BACKGROUND AND ARGUMENT

- B 2. Westlands approached MOD about the sale of Lynx in August, when they were discouraged from expecting HMG's approval because of the decision in OPD (74) 26 against the sale of helicopters with missiles to Syria. The Iraqis expressed interest in both Lynx and Gazelle to HM Embassy in Baghdad in October. Westlands have proceeded independently and have brought an Iraqi Air Force team here this week to discuss the possibility of a sale. Westlands are keen to receive an Iraqi order and have quoted 2½ years' delivery for both machines, which MOD consider will overstretch them, given their other commitments.
- C 3. OPD (74) 27 states that we should continue to maintain a very restrictive arms sales policy towards Iraq, limiting supplies to minor equipment and paying close attention to Iranian and Kuwaiti susceptibilities; we should test the Shah's reactions and inform the Kuwaitis before deciding finally on borderline cases, and we should ensure that no equipment is supplied which might significantly increase Iraqi capabilities in any future conflict with Israel.
- D 4. Both the Lynx and Gazelle have missile-carrying versions. As it would be contrary to the terms of OPD (74) 27 to supply missiles to Iraq, we can assume that these versions are ruled out of the consideration from the start. Although we know the Iraqis want the troop-carrying version of Lynx, they have not made clear their requirements for Gazelle. (It is possible to /fit

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

fit out the basic versions of both machines with missiles of any origin, including Russian equipment, after delivery but this is a complicated and expensive business beyond the technical competence of the Iraqis.)

5. Iraq's military helicopter fleet comprises 80 Russian (various types), 40 French (Alouette), and 9 British (Wessex troop carriers, the supply of which was agreed in 1964 along with Hunter fighters) machines. The Defence Intelligence Secretariat do not consider that the addition of some 70 British helicopters to this fleet would significantly increase Iraq's capabilities in any future conflict with Israel. The sale therefore would not conflict with the second criterion for defence sales to the Middle East as recorded in the minutes of OPD (74) 5th Meeting. Hitherto we have assumed that the Iraqis were buying from Western sources because of pressure from their military for alternatives to their shoddy Russian equipment but that this could not be interpreted as an indication that Iraq wanted to lessen its dependence on Russia as its major arms supplier. However, the Vice Chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council told the French Prime Minister during the latter's visit to Baghdad this week "Iraq needed to break away from her present dependence upon the Communist bloc." This could be a pointer to a shift in policy: we would of course want to encourage such a change in keeping with the third criterion for defence sales to the Middle East.

6. OPD (74) 26 ruled against the sale of helicopters with missiles to Syria along with other sophisticated equipment because of our doubts about Syria's long-term policy towards Israel and the importance therefore of such additions to her armoury to her capacity to wage war. Although Iraq takes a harder line than Syria in some respects over Arab/Israel matters, she matters less from a military point of view than Syria (the Iraqi military effort during the October 1973 hostilities was not impressive). We can also reasonably expect that the sale

/of

- 3 -

of helicopters to Iraq would not be so controversial in Israeli eyes and that consequently there should not be a reaction in this country comparable to that anticipated for a sale to Syria. In this regard, we should also take into account that delivery of any machines to Iraq before 1978 would be very unlikely.

G 7. As for Iranian and Kuwaiti susceptibilities, although the Shah has taken the view that he would prefer any Iraqi arms sales business to come to us so long as this does not increase Iraq's aggressive potential, which these helicopters would not do, we would want to test his views on helicopters separately. The Kuwaitis view realistically the relative military strength of Iraq and I do not consider that they would raise strong objections when we informed them of the sale in the usual way.

H 8. This sale has strong commercial attractions and if we do not take the opportunity we shall leave the field open to our competitors. The French have no inhibitions about helicopter sales to the Iraqis; they have already sold them Alouettes and we understand that they have made an offer for the French version of Gazelle. We have some control with the French over Gazelle and Lynx because these helicopters are an Anglo-French venture requiring joint agreement to any sale (although to date the French have not consulted us over Gazelle for Iraq). At the moment the Iraqis seem to favour purchasing helicopters from us and I think we should try to do as much business with them as we can within the limits of OPD (74) 27. Troop-carrying and general purpose helicopters would appear to qualify in this respect and while there may be some chance of an unfavourable public reaction to the sale, it is unlikely that this would be serious enough to warrant losing such a valuable order.

RECOMMENDATION


9. I recommend therefore that, subject to the Shah's views, we should inform MOD that we have no political objection to the sale of Lynx and Gazelle helicopters to Iraq providing it is

/made

- 4 -

made clear to the Iraqis that we will not equip these machines with missiles, nor will we sell them missiles separately. The MOD should be asked to seek agreement on the sale with the French in the usual way. A draft telegram to Tehran is attached.

10. NENAD, Defence Department and WED concur.



T J Clark
Middle East Department

4 December 1974

c.c.

Sir G Arthur
NENAD
Defence Dept
WED

File No. NBR 10/1

Department MED

Drafted by
(Block Capitals) P. A. RAFTERY

Tel. Extn..... MA 16

OUTWARD

TELEGRAM

Security Classification	
CONFIDENTIAL	
Precedence	
IMMEDIATE	
DESKBY	Z

FOR COMMS. DEPT. USE	Despatched	(Date)	POSTBY.....Z
		(Time)Z	

PREAMBLE

(Time of Origin)Z(G.M.T.) (Restrictive Prefix).....

(Security Class.) CONFIDENTIAL (Caveat/
Privacy Marking).....

(Codeword) (Deskby).....Z

TO..... IMMEDIATE TEHRAN Tel. No. of
(precedence) (post)

AND TO (precedence/post).....

AND SAVING TO.....

REPEATED TO (for info)..... JEDDA, KUWAIT, BAGHDAD

SAVING TO (for info).....

Distribution:-

Files
MED
Defence Dept
WED
Mr Weir
Sir G. Arthur

Copies to:-

MOD DS 13
MOD Sales 1b
Stuart House

[TEXT]

Your tel No 568: Arms Sales to Iraq.

1. The Iraqis are now interested in purchasing 40 Westland Lynx and 30 Westland Gazelle helicopters. They have specified that they required the troop-carrying version of Lynx but their requirement for Gazelle is not clear. First delivery would be unlikely before 1978. Ministers have agreed that, subject to the Shah's views, we would not object to the sale of these helicopters since they would not in themselves increase Iraq's aggressive potential. However, we could not agree to the sale of missile-equipped versions of any helicopters to Iraq nor would we allow the sale of

/missiles

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

missiles to Iraq separately.


2. For your information, an Iraqi Air Force team is here for discussions with Westlands at the latter's invitation. We have made it clear to Westlands that no decision on the sale of helicopters to Iraq has been taken by HMG and that they should be careful not to give the Iraqis the wrong impression in this respect.

3. Although we may possibly assume from paragraph 2 of your telegram under reference that the Shah would not object to this sale, it is a large order and we would want to test his views on helicopters for Iraq anyway. We should be grateful therefore if you would sound him out during your next audience. You might find that the statement by Saddam Hussein to Mr Chirac reported in paragraph 5 (b) of Baghdad telegram No 462 could serve as a useful lead-in to the subject.

F

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

CONFIDENTIAL



Dep. in L. G. Arthur (231)
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

P.A. 4/12

4 December, 1974.

I am writing to you about the sale of the Cymbeline mortar locating radar to Iraq, which has as you know become a problem because of MOD security limitations on delivery. As the matter seems likely to become a source of political difficulty in our relations with Iraq, I consider that we should try to do something to ease the problem following the Iraqi Foreign Minister's latest representations (Baghdad telegram No. 451 of 27 November, a copy of which you have seen) that we should advance the present delivery date (December 1975) by 6 months.

2. When we consulted our Ministers on this matter in October, their view was that the equipment could reasonably be supplied to Iraq 9 months after the delivery to Egypt, which I believe took place in September this year. We would therefore have no political objection to the delivery of Cymbeline to Iraq in June 1975, which just about coincides with the accelerated delivery requested by their Foreign Minister.

3. However, the security factor remains the nub of the problem. This is something for the MOD to assess, but I seriously question whether the security of Cymbeline for a few more months is of such importance that we should allow it to become a bone of contention between us and the Iraqis.

4. I should be grateful therefore if you would arrange as a matter of urgency for the case to be re-examined within the Ministry of Defence in the light of the latest representation from the Iraq Foreign Minister with a view to bringing forward the security limitation on delivery to June 1975.

(Geoffrey Arthur)

Sir Lester Suffield,
Head of Defence Sales,
Ministry of Defence.

CONFIDENTIAL

RECEIVED REGISTERED
-9 DEC 1974
NBR 10/11

FO 973/E 30/05

I have asked the Center to ensure that no
reply goes out on this telegram until
our letter to Sirhan Sirhan has been
acted on.

ETA 11/11/74
b/w

cc'd

TO Mr BRANEN DSR
→ Mr K. GATES
PA/HDS

LKS NR 503/5

PP MODUK

RR FCO

GRS 250

CYFHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 050958Z DEC.

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY MODUK TEL OF 5 DECEMBER 1974, INFO ROUTINE FCO.

DIG EBR/OGU.

FROM DA.

FOR MDS1.

CYMBELINE.

MOD DISTRIBUTION

MCD

M. Baffery
Pl. discuss

Jb/12

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 050958Z DEC.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

TO PRIORITY MODUK TEL OF 5 DECEMBER 1974, INFO ROUTINE FCO.

DIG EBR/OGU.

FROM DA.

FOR MDS1.

CYMBELINE.

FCO TEL NO 384 OF 21 NOV IS REF A.11

CUR TEL TO FCO NO 451 OF 27 NOV IS REF B.

ONE. DCGS CALLED ME TODAY ON CYMBELINE. THEY REQUIRED DECISION CONTAINED IN REF A IN WRITING WHICH WAS THEN HANDED TO THEM.

TWO. DCGS SAID THEY APPRECIATED OUR EFFORTS BUT

- A. COULD DELIVERY BE BROUGHT FORWARD ✓
- B. COULD EMI TRAINING START ASP *up to 21*
- C. COULD TACTICAL TRAINING BE BROUGHT FORWARD. ??

THREE. DCGS THEN SHOWED ME EMI CONTRACT WHICH STATED DELIVERY WOULD START 12 MONTHS FROM EFFECTIVE DATE. EFFECTIVE DATE BEING DEFINED AS DAY ON WHICH HMG ISSUED EXPORT LICENCE. AS CONTRACT HAD BEEN SIGNED IN SEPT AND EXPORT LICENCE HAD BEEN DELAYED UNTIL DECEMBER THEY FELT JUSTIFIED IN ASKING FOR DELIVERY AND TRAINING DATES TO BE BROUGHT FORWARD. AS IT WAS NOW TRAINING WOULD START IN OCTOBER AND DELIVERY NOT UNTIL DECEMBER AT EARLIEST. COULD TRAINING NOT BE BROUGHT FORWARD TO SAY MAY OR JUNE AND DELIVERY IN JULY OR AUGUST.

FOUR. HE SAID HE INTENDED ASKING EMI TO SEND OUT REP TO DISCUSS EARLIER DELIVERY AND TRAINING WOULD I PLEASE APPROACH MOD TO ATTEMPT TO BRING FORWARD ARMY COURSES.

GRAHAM

BT

NNNN

Mr Weir

CLUSTER BOMBS

Problem

1. The Jordanians wish to purchase cluster bombs from us and the Kuwaitis were given a demonstration of the bomb in January. What should be our policy on the sale of these bombs in the Middle East ?

Background

2. A description of the cluster bomb is attached. So far the only sales have been to NATO countries. Iran has expressed interest.

3. The previous Administration refused to sell cluster bombs to Egypt (in February this year) and to provide the Israelis with bomblets (ie the contents of the bomb, the shot inside the cartridge as it were) for use in a delivery system of their own manufacture (in July 1973).

Argument

4. Although Jordan was only marginally involved in the October war, there is little doubt that the sale of cluster bombs to her would provoke strong protests from the Israelis, particularly since we have refused to sell bomblets to them.

5. Similarly the sale of these bombs to any other Arab country, including Kuwait, is likely to provoke an adverse reaction from Israel not so much for fear that the Kuwaitis themselves might use them against her but because there is no effective way in which we could enforce a no-re-export clause on cluster bombs (there are no spare parts or servicing which we could threaten to withhold).

6. It is possible that, having demonstrated the bombs to the Kuwaitis, our refusal to take negotiations any further could put at risk other contracts now under negotiation with them. We do not think this risk is great; a refusal at this stage when interest is relatively small will be received better than one given later when the Kuwaitis might have expressed a serious desire to purchase.

7. More generally, the cluster bomb is a new weapon the use of which in further Middle East fighting would attract considerable attention and arouse strong emotions.


cc: MED
Def.D.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No.10
19 JUN 1974

NPS10/58/2

Recommendation


8. I recommend that we should confirm the decisions of the previous Administration on Egypt and Israel, decline the Jordanian request and inform the MOD that we could not approve supply to any Arab country. MED and Defence Department concur.



A J M Craig
Near East and North Africa
Department

14 June 1974

I think paragraph 7 above is the clincher: this is obviously a horrible weapon. I would not have hesitated to authorise a refusal of the Jordanian request without troubling Ministers, but it occurs to me that Ministers might like to be aware of the case and to know that it is not the automatic reaction of officials to recommend approval of every request for arms supplies!



M S Weir
14 June 1974

Minister of State.

I entirely agree and note
the sensitive implication of
the exclamation point!

17/6

NBR 10/1

Mr Weir

Mr Coles

HELICOPTERS FOR IRAQ

PROBLEM

1. The Ministry of Defence have sought our views on the sale to Iraq of 40 Westland Lynx troop carrying helicopters worth £20m and also 30 of the smaller Westland Gazelle general purpose helicopters. How should we respond?


BACKGROUND AND ARGUMENT

2. Westlands approached MOD about the sale of Lynx in August, when they were discouraged from expecting HMG's approval because of the decision in OPD(74) 26 against the sale of helicopters with missiles to Syria. The Iraqis took up the question of the sale of both Lynx and Gazelle with HM Embassy in Baghdad in October. Westlands have proceeded independently and are bringing an Iraqi Air Force Team here to discuss both machines at the end of this month. Westlands are keen to receive an Iraqi order and have quoted 2½ years delivery for both machines, which MOD consider will overstretch them, given their other commitments.

3. OPD(74)27 states that we should continue to maintain a very restrictive arms sales policy towards Iraq, limiting supplies to minor equipment and paying close attention to Iranian and

/Kuwaiti

CONFIDENTIAL



Mr. Roffey
Mr. Weir

233

Misfak - I think we
should indicate that the
troop carrying version
the Iraqis are said to want
does not carry missiles.
Also to speak of "veto"
is hardly in the spirit
of a joint project for our
mutual benefit! I have
therefore amended paras 4 & 5.

Mr. Roffey
27. 11. 74.

(See also 230
236)

Kuwaiti susceptibilities; we should test the Shah's reactions, and inform the Kuwaitis before deciding finally on borderline cases, and we should ensure that no equipment is supplied which might significantly increase Iraqi capabilities in any future conflict with Israel.

4. Iraq's military helicopter fleet comprises 80 Russian (various types), 40 French (Alouette), and 9 British (Wessex troop carriers, supply of which was agreed in 1964 along with Hunter fighters) machines. The Defence Intelligence Secretariat do not consider that the addition of some 70 British helicopters to this fleet would significantly increase Iraq's capabilities in any future conflict with Israel. ~~Nevertheless both helicopters~~ *Always the troop carrying Lynx does not carry missiles. Both the Gazelle & Lynx*

are capable of being used as missile-firing platforms, ~~and we~~ think therefore that the Israelis would be concerned over their sale to Iraq, as might also a section of opinion in this country. Although the Shah has taken the view that he would prefer any Iraqi arms sales business to come to us so long as this does not increase Iraqi aggressive potential, I think we would want to test his views on helicopters separately. Kuwait might be nervous over such a large number of helicopters for Iraq but the Kuwaitis view realistically the impossibility of their maintaining a military balance with Iraq.

5. This sale has strong commercial attractions and it is hard to reject it and so leave the field open to our competitors.

In this regard we have a hold over the French because both helicopters are a joint Anglo-French venture in which ~~either~~ *both* parties

are
~~has the~~

~~are required to agree on~~
~~has the right to veto~~ a sale by the other (we understand that the French have in fact made an offer to the Iraqis for the sale of Gazelle). It would however be inconsistent with our very restrictive arms sales policy to Iraq to do ~~otherwise~~^{so} because the acquisition of helicopters capable of firing missiles will undoubtedly increase the Iraqis aggressive potential.

RECOMMENDATION

6. I recommend therefore that we should inform MOD that we cannot approve the sale of Lynx and Gazelle helicopters in large numbers to Iraq because their missile-firing capability would increase the aggressive potential of the Iraqis and they cannot therefore be regarded as minor equipment in the terms of OPD(74)27. We should add that we propose to instruct HM Embassy in Paris to mention this decision informally to the Quai and to express the view that the French should take a similar line with the Iraqis.

7. NENAD, Defence Department and WED concur.

P R H. Wright
MED

c.c. Sir G Arthur

NENAD

Defence Department

CONFIDENTIAL

Miss McIntosh
Defence Dept



please telephone comment

MA 16 , AUTO 283

With the compliments of

P. RAPTERY , MED.

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

LONDON, SW1A 2AH 27.11.74

Amended

BHA

L27/h

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE

AFS 200

OPHER/CAT A

FM FCO 101110Z

(239)
I.A. [signature] (NBR 10/1)

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE TEHRAN TELNO 526 OF 10 DECEMBER 1974

INFO JEDDA KUWAIT AND BAGHDAD

YOUR TELNO 563: ARMS SALES TO IRAQ.

1. THE IRAQIS ARE NOW INTERESTED IN PURCHASING 40 WESTLAND LYNX AND 30 WESTLAND GAZELLE HELICOPTERS. THEY HAVE SPECIFIED THAT THEY REQUIRE THE TROOP-CARRYING VERSION OF LYNX BUT THEIR REQUIREMENT FOR GAZELLE IS NOT CLEAR. FIRST DELIVERY WOULD BE UNLIKELY BEFORE 1978. MINISTERS HAVE AGREED THAT, SUBJECT TO THE SHAH'S VIEWS, WE WOULD NOT OBJECT TO THE SALE OF THESE HELICOPTERS SINCE THEY WOULD NOT IN THEMSELVES INCREASE IRAQ'S AGGRESSIVE POTENTIAL. HOWEVER, WE COULD NOT AGREE TO THE SALE OF MISSILE-EQUIPPED VERSIONS OF ANY HELICOPTERS TO IRAQ NOR WOULD WE ALLOW THE SALE OF MISSILES TO IRAQ SEPARATELY.

2. FOR YOUR INFORMATION, AN IRAQI AIR FORCE TEAM IS HERE FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH WESTLANDS AT THE LATTER'S INVITATION. WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO WESTLANDS THAT NO DECISION ON THE SALE OF HELICOPTERS TO IRAQ HAS BEEN TAKEN BY HMG AND THAT THEY SHOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO GIVE THE IRAQIS THE WRONG IMPRESSION IN THIS RESPECT.

3. ALTHOUGH WE MAY POSSIBLY ASSUME FROM PARAGRAPH 2 OF YOUR TELEGRAM UNDER REFERENCE THAT THE SHAH WOULD NOT OBJECT TO THIS SALE, IT IS A LARGE ORDER AND WE WOULD WANT TO TEST HIS VIEWS ON HELICOPTERS FOR IRAQ ANYWAY. WE SHOULD BE GRATEFUL THEREFORE IF YOU WOULD SOUND HIM OUT DURING YOUR NEXT AUDIENCE.

CALLAGHAN

FILES


MED
DEFENCE DEPT
WED
SIR G ARTHUR
MR WEIR

COPIES TO:

MOD DS 13
MOD SALES 1b
STUART HSE

CONFIDENTIAL

(236) refers



(236)
Secretary of State.

Mr Weir

Mr Coles

Private Secretary

Telegram issued.

(235)

HELICOPTERS FOR IRAQ

PROBLEM

- A 1. The Ministry of Defence have sought our views on the sale to Iraq of 40 Westland Lynx troop-carrying helicopters worth £20 m. and also 30 of the smaller Westland Gazelle general purpose helicopters. How should we respond?

BACKGROUND AND ARGUMENT

- B 2. Westlands approached MOD about the sale of Lynx in August, when they were discouraged from expecting HMG's approval because of the decision in OPD (74) 26 against the sale of helicopters with missiles to Syria. The Iraqis expressed interest in both
- C Lynx and Gazelle to HM Embassy in Baghdad in October. Westlands have proceeded independently and have brought an Iraqi Air Force team here this week to discuss the possibility of a sale. Westlands are keen to receive an Iraqi order and have quoted 2½ years' delivery for both machines, which MOD consider will overstretch them, given their other commitments.
- D (86) 3. OPD (74) 27 states that we should continue to maintain a very restrictive arms sales policy towards Iraq, limiting supplies to minor equipment and paying close attention to Iranian and Kuwaiti susceptibilities; we should test the Shah's reactions and inform the Kuwaitis before deciding finally on borderline cases, and we should ensure that no equipment is supplied which might significantly increase Iraqi capabilities in any future conflict with Israel.
4. Both the Lynx and Gazelle have missile-carrying versions. As it would be contrary to the terms of OPD (74) 27 to supply missiles to Iraq, we can assume that these versions are ruled out of the consideration from the start. Although we know the Iraqis want the troop-carrying version of Lynx, they have not made clear their requirements for Gazelle. (It is possible to

/fit

- 2 -

fit out the basic versions of both machines with missiles of any origin, including Russian equipment, after delivery but this is a complicated and expensive business beyond the technical competence of the Iraqis.)

5. Iraq's military helicopter fleet comprises 80 Russian (various types), 40 French (Alouette), and 9 British (Wessex troop carriers, the supply of which was agreed in 1964 along with Hunter fighters) machines. The Defence Intelligence Secretariat do not consider that the addition of some 70 British helicopters to this fleet would significantly increase Iraq's capabilities in any future conflict with Israel. The sale therefore would not conflict with the second criterion for defence sales to the Middle East as recorded in the minutes of OPD (74) 5th Meeting. Hitherto we have assumed that the Iraqis were buying from Western sources because of pressure from their military for alternatives to their shoddy Russian equipment but that this could not be interpreted as an indication that Iraq wanted to lessen its dependence on Russia as its major arms supplier. However, the Vice Chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council told the French Prime Minister during the latter's visit to Baghdad this week "Iraq needed to break away from her present dependence upon the Communist bloc." This could be a pointer to a shift in policy: we would of course want to encourage such a change in keeping with the third criterion for defence sales to the Middle East.

6. OPD (74) 26 ruled against the sale of helicopters with missiles to Syria along with other sophisticated equipment because of our doubts about Syria's long-term policy towards Israel and the importance therefore of such additions to her armoury to her capacity to wage war. Although Iraq takes a harder line than Syria in some respects over Arab/Israel matters, she matters less from a military point of view than Syria (the Iraqi military effort during the October 1973 hostilities was not impressive). We can also reasonably expect that the sale

/of

- 3 -

True
are | of helicopters to Iraq would not be so controversial in Israeli eyes and that consequently there should not be a reaction in this country comparable to that anticipated for a sale to Syria. In this regard, we should also take into account that delivery of any machines to Iraq before 1978 would be very unlikely.

G 7. As for Iranian and Kuwaiti susceptibilities, although the Shah has taken the view that he would prefer any Iraqi arms sales business to come to us so long as this does not increase Iraq's aggressive potential, which these helicopters would not do, we would want to test his views on helicopters separately. The Kuwaitis view realistically the relative military strength of Iraq and I do not consider that they would raise strong objections when we informed them of the sale in the usual way.

H 8. This sale has strong commercial attractions and if we do not take the opportunity we shall leave the field open to our competitors. The French have no inhibitions about helicopter sales to the Iraqis; they have already sold them Alouettes and we understand that they have made an offer for the French version of Gazelle. We have some control with the French over Gazelle and Lynx because these helicopters are an Anglo-French venture requiring joint agreement to any sale (although to date the French have not consulted us over Gazelle for Iraq). At the moment the Iraqis seem to favour purchasing helicopters from us and I think we should try to do as much business with them as we can within the limits of OPD (74) 27. Troop-carrying and general purpose helicopters would appear to qualify in this respect and while there may be some chance of an unfavourable public reaction to the sale, it is unlikely that this would be serious enough to warrant losing such a valuable order.

RECOMMENDATION


9. I recommend therefore that, subject to the Shah's views, we should inform MOD that we have no political objection to the sale of Lynx and Gazelle helicopters to Iraq providing it is

/made

- 4 -

made clear to the Iraqis that we will not equip these machines with missiles, nor will we sell them missiles separately. The MOD should be asked to seek agreement on the sale with the French in the usual way. A draft telegram to Tehran is attached.

10. NENAD, Defence Department and WED concur.



T J Clark
Middle East Department

4 December 1974

c.c.

Sir G Arthur
NENAD
Defence Dept
WED

*I agree that with the proposed
provisos, and especially in view of the long
delivery delay, our criteria would be met.
This is indeed a valuable order, and we cannot
afford to leave the French a clear field (cf.
today's news of a \$1,000 million French arms sale
to Saudi Arabia).*

MJW
5/12

I agree.

AS Capen
5/12

Copy to P.S.T. 17/12/74
done 5/12

SECRET

GRS 310

PRIORITY

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 050915Z DEC.

SECRET

TO PRIORITY MODUK TEL OF 5 DECEMBER 1974, INFO
ROUTINE FCO.

DIG EBK/EBR.
FOR MDS 1.
FROM DA.

25 POUNDER GUNS.

MY EBK/EBR 160505Z NOV AND MY EBK/EBR 010730Z DEC REFERS.

ONE. DCGS CALLED ME TODAY FOR INFO ON 25 POUNDER SPARE
PARTS. HE ALSO SAID THEY REQUIRED AS MANY OF THE
FOLLOWING SHELLS AS POSSIBLE FOR THIS GUN.

- A. SHELLS WITH 117 FUSE.
- B. SHELLS WITH 119 FUSE.
- C. SHELLS WITH 213 TIMED FUSE.
- D. SMOKE SHELLS.

TWO. I UNDERTOOK TO REPORT THEIR REQUEST TO YOU WITHOUT
COMMITMENT.

THREE. DCGS THEN SHOWED ME IN CONFIDENCE AN OFFER
FROM COGSWELL AND HARRISON OF 168 PICADILLY. FOR THE SUPPLY
OF 25 POUNDER AMMO AND 5.5 INS SHELLS DELIVERY EX COMMONWEALTH
PORT.

FOUR. HE SAID ALTHOUGH THEY COULD GET THIS AMMO FROM
COGSWELL THEY PREFERRED TO DEAL WITH MOD WHOM THEY COULD TRUST.

FIVE. I FIND MYSELF IN A DIFFICULT POSITION AND WOULD
APPRECIATE ADVICE. I AM BEING TAKEN MORE AND MORE INTO THEIR
CONFIDENCE AND I WAS ASKED FOR ADVICE ON COGSWELLS WHICH I



SECRET

/DECLINED

Mr. Hester
Mr. Clark

*Unfortunately we no longer produce this
ammunition*

Telegram *IA* (237)
Mr. J. Hester



Miss McIntosh

SECRET

DECLINED TO GIVE ON THE GROUNDS I KNEW NOTHING OF THIS FIRM.
FURTHERMORE I DO NOT KNOW YOUR REACTION TO COGSWELLS OFFER
WHICH INFERS DELIVERY FROM A THIRD COUNTRY BEYOND OUR CONTROL.
IF PRESSURE WAS BROUGHT TO BEAR ON COGSWELLS TO CANCEL THIS
OFFER I WOULD THEN BE SEEN TO HAVE BROKEN IRAQIS CONFIDENCE
RELATIONS WOULD BE SOURED AND I WOULD CEASE TO ENJOY THE
GROWING CONFIDENCE WHICH ENABLES ME TO GIVE YOU WARNING OF
IRAQIS MOVES.

GRAHAM

FILES

EESD
DEFENCE DEPT

SECRET

RESTRICTED

LOOSE MINUTE

MD/HDS/20/53

Sales *[initials]*IRAQ - SHOPPING LIST

Reference:

We spoke Crawford/Grossman.

1. On his recent visit to see engineer equipment, Colonel Abdul Karim presented me with the following shopping list which I agreed to pass on to you:

a. Ammunition

25 pr

4.2" Mor (US)

75 mm (US)

5.5" (UK)

105 mm Arty (UK)

Anti personnel mines

Mine and booby trap accessories (ie switches and fuzes, trip flares)

b. Tracked APCs suitable for a crew of 9 including commander and driver (MDS1c tell me that the present version of Spartan will be too small for a crew of this size, but that a stretched version is being considered which may be large enough).

c. Scorpion Enough for 2 or 3 regiments.

d. Cymbeline (I explained that the contract had been signed and that the FCO was in contact with the Iraq government on the subject of delivery dates).

e. Any equipment for operations in mountains or snow covered areas, such as tents and winter clothing and footwear.

f. Mine detection equipment.

2. In the case of ammunition he wanted urgent and continuous deliveries. Other equipment he wanted as soon as possible. I told him that supplies of the first 3 items in the ammunition list were out of the question (this was on the advice of Sales Supply 1), and that the MOD authorities would need a little time to consider whether it was possible to supply the other items.

Mr. [unclear] 11/12 ✓

Mr. Willington 11/12

Mr. [unclear] Yes. Let's see what they ask for. 11/12
We shall soon be faced with

a decision on whether or not
ammunition can be supplied
to the [unclear] under the [unclear]
and (14) 27. I. [unclear] 11/12

R-1A.

11/12

RECEIVED IN	
REGISTRY No 35	
12 DEC 1974	
- 6 DEC 1974	
NBR 10/1	

RESTRICTED

RESTRICTED

3 According to C & T26, a small quantity of winter clothing is available as surplus, mainly ex-Korean war items but in new condition. These are Parkas (up to 500), string vests, mitts, neck scarves and headovers, and possibly a small quantity of boots. I did not tell him that these were available, but you may wish to take note of it.



J P K CRAWFORD
Lieutenant Colonel
MDS1b
WT 012 0013 MB

6 Dec 74

RESTRICTED

Sir G Arthur

ARMS SALES TO IRAQ

1. As requested in your minute of 5 December, I attach a draft reply to HM Ambassador in Baghdad.


T J Clark
Middle East Department

10 December 1974

c.c.

Mr Jackson (Defence Dept)
Mr Weir o.r.

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Registry
No.

DRAFT

letter

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

To:-

HE
Mr J A N Graham CMG
BAGHDAD

From

Sir G Arthur
Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ

(247)

C.C.

Mr Weir
Mr Jackson(Defence
Dept)

1. Thank you for your letter of 21 November.
2. The question of defence sales is inevitably bound to complicate our relations with the Iraqis. I need not go into the reasons, since you have already reviewed these comprehensively in your letter under reference (although I would say that there is not much evidence to support the view that equipment sold to the Iraqis may turn up in Dhofar). We recognise that Iraq is a good market at the moment and we are ready to sell what we can there within the terms of the sales policy agreed by Ministers. As you know, this policy is a restrictive one and we have to be careful that in applying it we do not hazard our best market in the world (Iran), nor upset political relations at home with Iraq's neighbours. These limitations apart, we are ready to compete with whatever is going and in this regard I would subscribe to the aims set out in paragraphs 27-31 of your Defence Attaché's letter to MOD Sales, enclosed with your letter under reference.
3. I can see that the situation is not comfortable from your end, where you have to strike a balance between being as forthcoming as possible with the Iraqis without getting cornered by requests which

/you

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

you know we cannot approve. In this regard we have tried to ease matters by encouraging direct dealings between the manufacturers and the Iraqis, thus avoiding your direct involvement as much as possible.

4. As for our performance with Iraq so far, it is relevant to bear in mind that the period reviewed by Col Sanders includes February-May this year, when sales to the confrontation states were frozen until the new administration introduced their present policy on sales in the Middle East generally and also that a specific policy on sales to Iraq was only decided by Ministers in July. Effectively therefore we have only been doing business with Iraq since July and you should find that our record since then has been both consistent and in keeping with the terms of our policy (the apparent inconsistency over night sights and ground surveillance radar seems to stem from a misreading of the MOD letter to Col Sanders about the radar, the sale of which was actually refused for security reasons).

5. The business of Cymbeline is tiresome but the trouble lies not with half-heartedness on the part of HMG as with EMI for not giving the Iraqis a proper idea of the delivery position at the time they went to contract. We have pressed vigorously for the relaxation of the security restrictions on this equipment and we had to enlist ^{the} support of our Ministers to reach the present position. While I sympathise with your query over the relative security of equipment which is already in Egyptian

/possession

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-3-

possession, security is outside the FCO's preserve and there are limits to the pressure we can apply. However, I agree that the Foreign Ministers' approach to you warrants our trying for a further relaxation of the restrictions and I have asked the MOD to consider this as a matter of urgency.

6. As you will have seen from our telegram No 526 to Tehran the fact that we hope to make a sale of helicopters to Iraq should also help your position.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

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1A. Lm/12

PRIORITY/ROUTINE 110900Z DEC

FROM MODUK ARMY
TO BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD
INFO FCO MED

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
12 DEC 1974
NRK 10/1

RESTRICTED
DIG OYP/LPE

FOR GRAHAM FROM MILLER SALES SUPPLY ONE D PD 25 POUNDER
AMMUNTION PD YOUR A PD B PD AND C PD WHICH ARE H PD E PD
ARE NOT AVAIALABLE FROM STOCK OR NEW PRODUCTION PD NO
LONGER MADE BY US PD LIMITED AMOUNTS OF SMOKE AND ILLUMINATING
PD PLEASE STATE QUANTITY REQUIRED PD COGSWELL AND HARRISON
REPUTABLE FIRM KNOWN TO US PD WE REFER CUSTOMERS FOR H PD
E PD TO THEM OURSELVES FROM TIME TO TIME

FILES

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DEFENCE D

MR CAMPBELL

MR THOMSON

RESTRICTED

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Priority
CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

FM F C O 111820Z

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TOP COPY

RECEIVED IN REGISTER N 30 12 DEC 1974 (NAR 10/1)

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NUMBER 335 OF 11 DECEMBER, 1974.
YOUR TELEGRAM TO MODUK 050915Z DEC: 25 POUNDER AMMUNITION.

1. WE NO LONGER MANUFACTURE THIS TYPE OF AMMUNITION AND ONLY THE
SMOKE SHELLS ARE AVAILABLE FROM STOCK: M O D ARE TELEGRAPHING
THE DETAILS.

2. YOUR DEFENCE ATTACHE MAY CONFIRM TO THE IRAQIS THAT COGSWELL
AND HARRISON ARE A REPUTABLE BRITISH FIRM OF ARMS DEALERS. AS
IT IS PREFERABLE FOR THE IRAQIS TO CONTINUE DEALING DIRECT WITH
THE FIRM, HE SHOULD AVOID ANY FURTHER INVOLVEMENT.

3. FOR YOUR OWN INFORMATION, THE SUPPLIER IS PROBABLY INDIA. IF
THIS IS THE CASE THEN COGSWELL AND HARRISON ARE FREE TO HANDLE
ANY ORDERS WITHOUT REFERENCE TO H M G.

CALLAGHAN

FILES
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DEFENCE D.
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR.

COPIES TO
MOD SALES I
MOD SALES Supply
ELB, DOT

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
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CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 120525Z DEC

CONFIDENTIAL



TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 476 OF 12 DECEMBER/⁷⁴SAVING TEHRAN AND KUWAIT.

MY TELNO 451 : CYMBELINE

THE IRAQI C.G.S. RAISED THIS WITH ME YESTERDAY WHEN I PAID A COURTESY CALL ON HIM. THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IS AWAY FOR THE REST OF THIS WEEK BUT I HOPE I MAY BE IN A POSITION TO GIVE HIM A REPLY NEXT WEEK.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TEHRAN AND KUWAIT.

GRAHAM

/REPEATED AS REQUESTED/

FILES

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DEFENCE D

MR CAMPBELL

MR WEIR

SIR G ARTHUR

MR THOMSON

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
243



DEFENCE, MILITARY & AIR ATTACHES
BRITISH EMBASSY
BAGHDAD

DA/31

Mr I S McDonald
Director of Sales 1
Ministry of Defence
Stuart House
23-25 Soho Square
London W1V 5FJ



21st November 1974

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ

References:

- A. My letter to Defence Sales 1 of 18 February 1974.
- B. My EBR/LPE 270930Z Oct.
- C. D Sales 1 EDB 061245Z Nov.

General

1. I arrived in this post in December 1973 and because of the nature of my original appointment, the absence of diplomatic relations, the Middle East Arms Embargo and the low level of Defence Sales to Iraq, I did not receive any Defence Sales briefing.
2. As a result of the 8th Regional Party Conference in January of this year Iraq, with her vastly increased oil revenue, a certain disillusion with her Eastern suppliers and a need to build up her armed forces as a result of her experience in the October War, decided on a more non-aligned policy and to try and purchase more equipment, both civilian and military, from the West. Officers I spoke to emphasised this trend but also added that they would continue to demand and receive equipment from the Eastern Bloc.
3. As the year progressed indications of this change of policy manifested themselves. My relations with MOD became much more open and friendly and their desire to re-establish their links with the British Army became obvious when demands for training, visits to Service establishments and their insatiable demand for Service publications increased very considerably.
4. At the same time businessmen from the European countries, Japan and America began pouring into Baghdad. Yugoslavia, West Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Sweden, Belgium and even Holland have been approached for Defence Equipment, and, in the case of Yugoslavia, France and Spain, considerable business has already been completed.
5. In April I returned to UK for briefing on resumption of diplomatic relations and went to great lengths to explain the situation in Iraq vis a vis Defence Sales to ECO and MOD Defence Sales.
6. Although I received a very sympathetic hearing, the problems of our relations with Iran and Kuwait, the security factor, and the politically emotive words 'arms sales' in the Middle East context, only caused my

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listeners to sympathise with our position in Baghdad, and to understand the frustration of a very rich market with great potential being lost in some cases to our European partners, because of the narrow policy lines laid down in London.

7. I explained that even though it was clearly understood by us and more so by the Iraqis that we would not supply them with such offensive equipment as Jaguar or Chieftain, although they would "try it on", there was a wide range of soft or non-offensive equipment that they would like from us. Despite the ups and downs of our relations since 1958 there is still within the Iraqi Services an enormous respect for our customs and traditions and a desire where possible to buy British.

8. I returned again to London in July to continue my campaign and felt that the ground was not quite as stony as on my earlier visit.

Iraq's Potential

9. We are constantly being told that we need to export to survive. Last year Iraq's Defence Expenditure figures were 10% of GNP or 30% of her Budget, which amounts to \$25 per head of the population. These figures were obtained by me in Beirut a week ago from Dr ELIAS SABA, former Lebanese Minister of Finance and Defence.

10. If this percentage continues and there is every reason to believe it may have increased, taken together with her income from oil, one can imagine the potential for our exports.

11. Furthermore on a recent MECAS Background Course I attended in Beirut, we were informed by experts from ARAMCO (Mr D M SQUIRES, Chief Economist) and Mr ADRIAN SMITH from FCO that Iraq's oil reserves could well be greater than those of Saudi Arabia.

Objection to Defence Sales in Iraq

12. One of the major arguments put forward against Defence Sales to Iraq was the question of our relations with Iran. Over the past three months whenever we have asked the Shah for his reactions to a proposed sale to Iraq e.g. Cymbeline, HS Hawk, etc, he has taken the realistic approach that he would be happy for us to have the sale because if we did not sell it to the Iraqis they would only get the equipment from someone else.

13. From a purely commercial point of view the potential in Iraq is far greater than that in Kuwait, and besides, some of the major Defence contracts we were hoping for in Kuwait earlier this year seem to have gone to the United States and France.

14. The security argument very often seems to be put forward when all else fails. This argument appears to break down when you consider the equipment we are at present contracting to supply to Yugoslavia and Egypt.

Iraq/Egypt/Syria Triangle

15. It is almost inevitable that the more equipment we agree to supply to Egypt, the more this is reflected in the requests we receive in Iraq for

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the same equipment. I believe this is also reflected in Syria. It is interesting to note that Cymbeline and Gazelle helicopters, both sold to Egypt, are now being asked for by Iraq.

DA Involvement in Sales

16. Whether FCO like it or not I am almost inevitably getting more and more involved in Defence Sales (Ref FCO Tel No 31 of 20 Feb 74 and FCO Tel No 235 of 17 Sep).

17. I have been called officially 3 times in the past 6 weeks to be asked when HMG would be issuing the export licence for Cymbeline. Approaches for HS Hawk, a wide range of Engineer Equipment, Lynx and Gazelle helicopters, have all been made through this office. In a very frank outburst from Colonel OSAMA AL MAHDI, the new Director of Armaments and Supplies, (who incidentally was a contemporary of mine at Sandhurst) who was baffled by our delay over the issue of an export licence for Cymbeline, he said he had every intention of using me much more for their requests for Defence Equipment and would keep me fully in the picture of any approaches they made to British companies.

Reactions from London

18. Earlier this year most of these reactions were negative and in some cases difficult to understand. The initial reaction to Reference A and to my warning about the Iraqi request for the Hawk Trainer was to tell me to avoid discussing the matter and if necessary to refer to my limited terms of reference (at that time) (FCO Tel No 31 of 20 Feb refers).

19. Requests by Iraq for the Bar Mine Layer were too controversial and it was suggested we tell them that the "need for humidity control presents problems in Iraq" (Sales 1b EBR/LPE 031310Z Oct refers). Iraq has one of the least humid climates in the world.

20. A request by the Air Force, who frequently send officers on the Air Traffic Control Course, to visit the School and purchase equipment afterwards to set up their own ATC School met with the reply "there might be difficulty over the Sales aspects".

21. ZB 298 which could hardly be called offensive was rejected in a letter from Defence Sales - "we remain sensitive to the possible repercussions of supplying to Iraq anything resembling offensive equipment at the present time". Yet we have now agreed to supply night vision aids - presumably a very similar equipment. Incidentally the ZB 298 contract was in competition with the more expensive French RASIT (72A) (Rapriere) which the French will now no doubt sell them.

22. We are being tardy over Service training support for the completed sale of two ICL Computers to the Army and Air Force when ICL at the moment are in keen competition with the French for the sale of a further computer to the Ministry of the Interior, which if successful could give ICL a firm foothold in Iraq for a very profitable market.

Known Enquiries/Contracts for Defence Equipment

23. At Annex A to this letter is a list of that equipment for which we have either received an enquiry or an order that is known to us.

24. Iraq continues to be a secretive market. Salesmen find it difficult

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to obtain visas to enter the country without official invitations and once here, despite the recent law on corruption designed to stop both agents' and officers' "kick backs" on sales (unless the equipment they are selling is urgently required) the usual back door arrangements are made. In these circumstances one often only learns of the impending sale when the equipment comes up for the export licence to be granted.

25. It can be seen from this that even assuming that not all of the present enquiries reach fruition, our orders this year amount to £46M. Our total exports of all goods to Iraq in 1973 was £27.1M.

26. If one takes an optimistic view and assumes that all of the present enquiries result in sales the total would be in excess of £240M for Defence Sales alone.

Hopes for the Future


27. Although we are not asking for, or expecting a change in policy towards Defence Sales for Iraq, we are asking for the application of the policy to be more flexible and consistent and that once a decision in favour of supplying an item of equipment is made we proceed in an enthusiastic and speedy manner.

28. If we continue to be slow in our reactions to Iraqi requests (e.g. Cymbeline) and it is seen that we are dragging our feet over relatively harmless equipment, there will be eventually a reflection in the political and purely civilian commercial fields.

29. When bids for equipment come from Iraq can those concerned look for ways and means of supplying the equipment rather than reasons why we should not supply it, except of course where the equipment is clearly controversial.

30. Can Defence Sales and MOD Sales now see more of the many Service visitors from Iraq. (The recent reaction of MDS 2 over the visit of the Engineer Officers has been most encouraging). (On the other hand the absence of any escorting officer for the Iraq Air Force delegation to Farnborough was very noticeable to the Iraqis).

31. A more honest, open, helpful approach (which will involve giving a 'no' answer periodically; for example our refusal to supply the cluster bomb for the Hunters) will be understood and appreciated by Iraq and will show them we are doing our best to support our stated intention of improving economic relations between the two countries.


J Y SANDERS
Lieutenant Colonel
DEFENCE ATTACHE

Internal copy to:

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H of C
FS (C)

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ - JANUARY-NOVEMBER 1974

<u>Company</u>	<u>Equipment</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Request (Bid)/ Contract</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
ICL	4 computers - 2 IAF and 2 Army	£½ M	Contract	Signed May 1974
IMI	Cymbeline	£4 M	Contract	Subject to Export Licence
Hawker Siddeley	HS 1182 Hawk Trainer	£40M	Request	Negotiations believed to have started
Plessey	Modification to P35 Russian Radar	£½ M	Contract	Completed
Britten-Norman	Islander Aircraft	-	Request	No further information
Omega-Engineering	Prefabricated Cold Stores for Army	£½ M	Request	No further information
Cerentation Ltd	Military Hospital	£70M	Request	Tendering
Marconi	Installation and inspection of radio equipment sold to Iraq in 1970	£½ M	Contract	Completed
Solatron	Simfire	-	Request	Demo 1971. Further enquiries
Westlands	Spare parts for helicopters purchased in 1963/64	-	Contract	No further information
Hawker Siddeley	Spare parts for Hunters	-	Contract	No further information
RACAL	Radio Equipment	£5 M	Contract	Over last 3 years
Richmond Electronics	Bomb Disposal Equipment	-	Contract	Increase existing contract

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British Leyland	1000 x 109 LRs	£3½M	-	Contract under discussion
Thomas Storey	Emergency bridging equipment	-	Request	No further information
MOD Sales	Field Tents	-	Request	No further information
MOD Sales/Fairey	Medium and Heavy Bridging equipment	£5 M	Request	HMG agreed. Team of Engineer Officers to visit UK 20 Nov.
Cummins	Antar Tank Transporters to be re-engined with RR diesel engines	-	Request	No further information
Westlands	40 Lynx and 30 Gazelle	-	Request	Visit to Westlands 29 Nov
Hunting	Cluster Bombs	-	Request	Rejected by HMG
-	Hovercraft/Radar/Navigational equipment, instructional equipment for Iraqi Navy	-	Request	Passed to Defence Sales
MOD	Spare parts for 25 pounder gun supplied by UK	-	Request	Passed to Defence Sales
British Leyland	200 x 109 LRs, 50 x 88 LRs for IAF and 50 Ambulances	-	Request	PL in Baghdad discussing
Laird (Anglesey) and MOD Sales	Combat Engineer Tractors/Power Raft Class 16	-	Request	HMG agreed. Quotation being prepared
Dennis	Fire Engines	£800,000	Contract	Completed
Marconi	1Kw Troposphonic Scatter	£1½M	Contract without tender	HMG agreed
Marconi	Clansman	£2 M	Contract	HMG agreed
Plessey	Artillery Sound Ranging System	£2.4M	Contract	HMG agreed

CONFIDENTIAL

-	Night vision units for armoured cars	£29M	Contract	HMG agreed
-	Aluminium Runway	£5 M	Request	Linked with Engineer Officers visit 20 Nov.
Marconi	24 x ZB 298	£ $\frac{3}{4}$ M	Request	Initial refusal by HMG?
British Leyland/ Scammell	Tank Transporters	-	Request	FOIN contract believed to have met problems. RR/BL/Scammell reinvestigating. Request to us in 1973 rejected.
Plessey	UHF Manpack, Morse Trg Equipment and Nickle Carbon Batteries	-	Request	Passed to Defence Sales



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BRITISH EMBASSY
BAGHDAD

21 November 1974

*Mr. Rymy for*Sir Geoffrey Arthur KCMG
Deputy Under-Secretary of State
F C O

NBR 10/1

(239) refs

- ① Mr. Wright (MED) 26/11*
② Mr. Jackson (Defence Dept)

Dear Geoffrey,

ARMS SALES TO IRAQ

It does look a little inconsistent but that is nothing new. Could we pl. discuss

1. I enclose a copy of a letter the Defence Attache has written to the Director of Sales in the Ministry of Defence. He discussed it with me in draft and I am in agreement with his general argument. Like him I accept that for various reasons, HMG have to pursue a restrictive policy in approving sales of arms to Iraq: there is the security angle with the likelihood that the Russians will sooner or later obtain knowledge of the characteristics and performance of equipment we supply; there is the calculation that equipment supplied to Iraq may turn up e.g. in Dhofar: there is the Arab-Israel dispute in which Iraq takes an extreme line: there is the possible reaction of Iran; there is the Kurdish war; and there is a general distaste for the Iraqi regime stemming from such things as the Jewish trials and executions, which makes supply domestically difficult. Some of these are more strictly relevant than others, but I accept that they all carry weight, and that the present restrictive policy must stand. Against this however must be set certain indications of a change in atmosphere here. For example, we believe that the Iraqi Military are becoming disenchanted with the Russians because of the shoddy equipment and second rate servicing they receive from them. The newly appointed Iraq Military Attache to London has told Sanders that his briefings have shown a strong desire by the military authorities to strengthen their links with the British Services. He saw his main task as a sort of purchasing agent for military equipment.

2. All this is a bit speculative as yet, but what puzzles us here is the apparent inconsistency with which our present policy is interpreted. For example, it is surely inconsistent to approve the order for night-sights for armoured vehicles but to reject the order for ground surveillance radar (ZB 298). Moreover, once agreement has been given, we seem to be very half-hearted in following things up. Cymbeline is the prime case in point, where we have been holding up the grant of an export licence and risk losing the whole order. Cymbeline has been supplied to Egypt so it is unlikely to be much of a secret so far as the Russians are concerned; it is a defensive weapon

/so

See reply at (250)

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so objection to its supply on the grounds that it may be used in Kurdistan is surely no greater than in the case of the night vision units for armoured cars.

3. I feel like signing this letter "puzzled"! The fact is that a clear refusal on honest grounds, as in the case of the cluster bombs, is readily understood here. But half-hearted responses or disingenuous pretexts will cause a good deal of ill-will and put at risk a potentially very valuable market, commercial as well as military.

Yours ever
JAG

J A N Graham

Enc

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr Wright

ARMS SALES TO IRAQ

1. Reference Mr Graham's letter of 21 November.
2. We can turn this letter to useful account since it will enable us to clear the air with Mr Graham over ~~to~~ arms sales to Iraq and also allow us to put a damper on the enthusiasm of the Defence Attaché for direct arms sales involvement with the Iraqis.
3. While we recognize the burgeoning Iraqi market and are ready to sell what we can there, we are equally aware that it represents a minefield for HMG where a false move could result in political repercussions both in Israel and at home; it could also put at risk our main defence sales market in Iran and/or upset our relations with Kuwait. We have been given a very restrictive sales policy framework within which to operate and we try to avoid getting involved in direct discussions with the Iraqi Government over arms sales. For this reason we have steered the Defence Attaché away from direct actions and emphasised that the manufacturers should make the running with the Iraqis.
4. The impressions in Baghdad that we are inconsistent in applying our policy towards Iraq seems to stem from a lack of comprehension by the Defence Attaché of the political background. I explained to him when he was here in July that there had been a virtual freeze on arms sales to the confrontation countries in the Middle East between February and May this year because the new Administration had not reached a policy decision; furthermore, a specific policy on sales to Iraq was not decided until July. All significant cases since then have been considered at least at Under-Secretary level and I can see no inconsistency in the decisions which have been taken. Actually, we have made special arrangements for the Ministry of Defence Intelligence Staff to provide military assessments of the significance of any defence equipment in which Iraq is interested, something which is not done for any other country.
5. The case of apparent inconsistency referred to by Mr Graham is readily explicable. The night sights were cleared by us last month but the ZB298 surveillance radar was rejected by MoD on security grounds in May, i.e. before the arms sales policy for Iraq came into effect. (According to MoD Sales, the DA has quoted out of context in paragraph 21 of his letter) There is therefore no common ground for comparison.

/6. Although

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6. Although it may appear to Baghdad that we were dragging our feet over Cymbeline, we in fact went to considerable lengths to get ministerial support for relaxing the security restrictions on this equipment. I believe that MoD Sales explained these restrictions to the Defence Attaché in July but it is probable that he did not fully comprehend them. The Cymbeline business became complicated because EMI, while fully aware of the security restrictions, presented the Iraqis with a draft contract which was virtually dependant on HMG's agreement to allow early delivery of the equipment. We did not know of this when we submitted Cymbeline and Ministers agreed the sale on the understanding of a long term delivery date.

7. The following are comments on points in the Defence Attaché's letter to MoD which are not already covered above:

(i) Paragraph 12: Our first pre-occupation over sales to Iraq is Arab/Israel, then Iran. The Shah's realism is, as you know, tempered by the condition that we should not increase Iraq's aggressive potential;

(ii) Paragraph 14: Security has only been a consideration in one instance so far, i.e. Cymbeline;

(iii) Paragraph 15: Sales to Egypt do contrast oddly with our attitude towards Syria and Iraq but this cannot be helped;

(iv) Paragraph 16: The Iraqis will I imagine keep up the pressure on the Defence Attaché and we will have to leave it to him to play it cool, not to be more forthcoming than is necessary and to try as far as possible to pass the ball to the manufacturers;

(v) Paragraph 30: We should continue to avoid getting HMG involved over visits by Iraqis at the invitation of manufacturers, which often take place against the advice of MoD Sales (e.g. the Westlands visit this week). The recent visit of Iraqi engineers invited by Faireys almost got out of hand because of MoD involvement, with the military planning to demonstrate hardware which the Iraqis would not be allowed to purchase;

(vi) Paragraph 31: There has been no equivocation on straight refusals to the Iraqi Government. The BL755 bomb has been the only instance since the sales policy was implemented. But we should continue to deal as much as possible through the manufacturers so that we do not have to explain our decisions to the Iraqis on every occasion.

I. Raftery
P A Raftery
Middle East Dept
W 98C MA 16

27 November 1974

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Mr Clark
Mr Jackson (Defence Dept)
Mr Weir
Sir G Arthur

Seen. I am ready for a meeting
when called. Jackson 3/12.

17 DEC 1974

NBR 10/1

ARMS SALES TO IRAQ

1. Sir Geoffrey Arthur has asked Mr Jackson and myself to discuss the letter of 21 November from HM Ambassador Baghdad about arms sales to Iraq. I regret that I was not able to take any action on this before today and Sir Geoffrey Arthur's absence and my own imminent departure from this department means that I will not now have an opportunity to discuss this question personally with him.

2. I attach a useful minute by Mr Raftery commenting on some of the points in Mr Graham's letter and the enclosed letter from his Defence Attache to MOD Sales. Since receiving this correspondence, we have had Baghdad telegram No 451 asking whether we can obtain any relaxation of the security limitations on the export of this equipment. I hope very much that Sir Geoffrey Arthur might agree to support a further approach to the Ministry of Defence on this question (although our earlier approach supported by the Minister of State failed to achieve as much relaxation of the security rules as we had hoped). On the face of it, it is patently ridiculous that we should be debarred on security grounds alone from releasing Cymbeline to the Iraqis until more than a year after its release to the Egyptians.

P R H Wright

P R H Wright
Middle East Department

28 November 1974

If you can meanwhile approach the
Ambassador in Baghdad I am not sure that
we need a meeting. I will be content to see
Mr Graham's letter answered on the basis of Mr
Raftery's minute.

Answer

I have signed the letter to Dyf Sales on Cymbeline & agree
no need meeting. (MED) pl. diff short reply to
Mr. Graham?

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
by min.
3/12

5/12

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247

Sir G Arthur



Mr Burt 16/12
J 13/12

ARMS SALES TO IRAQ

1. As requested in your minute of 5 December, I attach a draft reply to HM Ambassador in Baghdad.

A handwritten signature, likely of T J Clark.

T J Clark
Middle East Department


10 December 1974

c.c.

Mr Jackson (Defence Dept)
Mr Weir o.r.

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TO ROUTINE MODUK TELNO 111100Z DEC.

DIG EBR/EDW

FROM DA FOR MDS 1B.

1. IRAQ MOD STILL TRYING TO OBTAIN QUOTE FOR 200 X 20 TON VEHICLES WITH 20 TON TRAILERS.

2. BRITISH LEYLAND UNABLE TO HELP.
CAN YOU TRY OTHER COMPANIES?

GRAHAM

BT

MOD DISTRIBUTION

MED

Mr. [Signature] 12/12
Mr. [Signature] 12/12
[Signature] 12/12

VV

+3+
ADVANCE COPY

K12g
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249

RECEIVED IN REGISTER N° 35 17 DEC 1974 NBR 10/1
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DFA176 12/2259 346A3957

FOR DFA

PRIORITY/ROUTINE 121615Z DEC

FROM MODUK
TO BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD
INFO FCO MED

MOD DISTRIBUTION

CONFIDENTIAL
DIG EBR

FROM SALES 1B. MEDIUM GIRDER BRIDGE. FAIREY ENGINEERING
REQUEST THAT YOU URGENTLY HAND CARRY FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO
COLONEL ABDULS DEPT OR SENIOR OFFICER RESPONSIBLE FOR
MGB PURCHASE. QUOTE. REFERENCE CONTRACT DATED 26 NOV 1974
FOR THE SUPPLY OF MEDIUM GIRDER BRIDGE WE, FAIREY
ENGINEERING LTD, ARE PROCEEDING WITH THE PURCHASE OF
MATERIALS TO ENABLE US TO HONOUR OUR COMMITMENTS AND
DELIVERY SCHEDULE AS STATED IN THE ABOVE CONTRACT. IT IS
THEREFORE IMPERATIVE THAT WE KNOW THE EXACT DATE WHEN
DOWN PAYMENT AND IRREVOCABLE LETTER OF CREDIT WILL BE
FINALISED. MR R S BIRD, COMMERCIAL MANGER, AND COLONEL
HARTINGTON, TECHNICAL EXPERT, ARE PREPARED FOR IMMEDIATE
VISIT TO BAGHDAD SHOULD ANY FINAL DETAILS BE DELAYING
DOWN PAYMENT. IF SUCH A VISIT IS NECESSARY PLEASE PROVIDE
VISAS FOR BIRD AND HARTINGTON ON AN URGENT BASIS. REGARDS
BIRD, FAIREY ENGINEERING LTD. UNQUOTE.

BT

M. R. Bird
Y. 13/12

250

Resp. in Sir G. Arthur's
file



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

RECEIVED IN REGISTRATION 17 DEC 1974 NBR 10/1
--

Your reference

Our reference

Date 12 December, 1974.

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Johnny,

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ

Thank you for your letter of 21 November.

2. The question of defence sales is bound to complicate our relations with the Iraqis. I need not go into the reasons: you have reviewed these comprehensively in your letter under reference (although I would say that there is not much evidence to support the view that equipment sold to the Iraqis may turn up in Dhofar). We recognise that Iraq is a good market at the moment and we are ready to sell what we can there within the terms of the sales policy agreed by Ministers. As you know, this policy is a restrictive one and we have to be careful that in applying it we neither hazard our best market in the world (Iran) nor create political difficulties at home. These limitations apart, we are ready to compete with whatever is going and in this regard I would subscribe to the aims set out in paragraphs 27-31 of your Defence Attaché's letter to MOD Sales, enclosed with your letter under reference.
3. I can see that the situation is not comfortable at your end, where you have to strike a balance between being as forthcoming as possible with the Iraqis without getting cornered by requests which you know we cannot approve. We have tried to ease matters by encouraging direct dealings between the manufacturers and the Iraqis, thus avoiding your direct involvement as much as possible.
4. As for our performance with Iraq so far, we should bear in mind, first that the period reviewed by Colonel Sanders includes February-May this year, when sales to the confrontation states were frozen until the new administration introduced their present policy on sales in the Middle East generally, and secondly, that a specific policy on sales to Iraq was only decided by Ministers in July. Effectively therefore we have only been doing business with Iraq since July and you

J.A.N. Graham, Esq., CMG,
Baghdad.

/should

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should find that our record since then has been both consistent and in keeping with the terms of our policy (the apparent inconsistency over night sights and ground surveillance radar seems to stem from a misreading of the MOD letter to Colonel Sanders about the radar, the sale of which was actually refused for security reasons).

So much) 5. The business of Cymbeline is tiresome but the trouble lies not with half-heartedness on the part of HMG as with EMI for not giving the Iraqis a proper idea of the delivery position at the time they went to contract. We have pressed vigorously for the relaxation of the security restrictions on this equipment and we had to enlist the support of our Ministers to reach the present position. While I sympathise with your query over the relative security of equipment which is already in Egyptian possession, security is outside the FCO's preserve and there are limits to the pressure we can apply. However, I agree that the Foreign Minister's approach to you warrants our trying for a further relaxation of the restrictions and I have personally asked the MOD to consider this as a matter of urgency.

6. As you will have seen from our telegram No. 526 to Tehran the fact that we hope to make a sale of helicopters to Iraq should also help your position.

Yours ever

Geoffrey


(Geoffrey Arthur)

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DEFENCE, MILITARY & AIR ATTACHÉS
BRITISH EMBASSY
BAGHDAD

c/o Foreign & Commonwealth Office
King Charles Street
London SW1



DA/31/6

Defence Sales 1
Ministry of Defence
Stuart House
Soho Square
London W1

9th December 1974

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ - HAWKER SIDDELEY 1182 (HAWK TRAINER)

1. Mr Brian (Middle East Rep) and Mr Johnson have just concluded a visit to Iraq to discuss the sale of the Hawker Siddeley 1182.
2. The visit was successful and both Hawker Siddeley representatives were received very warmly. The Iraqis went out of their way to express their very great confidence in Hawker Siddeley and their great confidence and trust in the Hunters that have been in service with the Iraqi Air Force for some time.
3. It has been established that of the 92 Hunters originally sold to Iraq by Hawker Siddeley there are approximately 30 remaining and flying at this moment. This does not take in to account any other Hunters purchased by Iraq from any third country.
4. Mr Johnson is shortly returning to the United Kingdom to prepare a contract for:
 - a. 40 Hawk Trainers at an approximate cost of £5M
 - OR
 - b. 60 Hawk Trainers at an approximate cost of £7M.
5. It would appear that the Iraqis are very keen to purchase this aircraft and they have no objections to a 1977/78 delivery forecast.

J Y Sanders
J Y SANDERS
Lieutenant Colonel
Defence Attache

Copy to:

FCO - MED
Def Dept.

CONFIDENTIAL

(252)



BRITISH EMBASSY
BAGHDAD

10 December 1974

M S Weir Esq CMG
Assistant Under-Secretary
F C O

Dear Michael,

THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES

1. I paid a first call today on the Iraqi Chief of the General Staff, Lt Gen Abdul Jabbar Khalil Shanshal. He is a portly figure of, I should guess, about 55, a career soldier and, so far as we know, not a party man. He speaks some English, but haltingly, and there was an interpreter present.
2. General Shanshal was very friendly and emphasised the traditional links between the Iraqi Armed Forces and our own, making the point that their drill and tactics are still modelled on British practice - I can vouch for this as far as the ceremonial drill is concerned from the many occasions that I have observed it at the airport. Shanshal said that they would like to receive all our training pamphlets and places on as many courses as possible. On the former there had been some hold-up in the past when they had ceased to receive copies and on the latter we were unfortunately fairly niggardly. I said that I believed that the supply of pamphlets was going forward - the Defence Attache confirmed this and pointed out that in part at least the trouble over supply had originated in the Iraqi Embassy in London where the pamphlets were delivered and seemed to go to ground: as for the courses, the number of places was, of course, limited and the number of applicants was very large. If we could not meet all Iraq's requests, it was no sign of lack of goodwill but was due to the pressure on places. General Shanshal said he entirely accepted that there was no lack of goodwill: he hoped we could nevertheless increase Iraq's allocation.
3. I asked General Shanshal about the fighting in the north: presumably it had closed down now that the winter had set in. He said with great firmness that the Iraq Government's policy was to crush the rebellion. It was certainly true that the winter was a factor but soldiers were trained to fight in all circumstances. The rebellion had been confined to a small area and, were it not for outside support, and indeed instigation, it would have collapsed. Picking him up, I made the point that a political settlement must surely follow a military victory - in the words of British Army doctrine, it was necessary to win the hearts and minds of the local populace. Shanshal said he

/entirely

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270 refer
for reply - see (281)



CONFIDENTIAL

entirely agreed and the Iraqi army had been at pains to spare those not directly involved in the fighting from hardship. Those whose villages had been destroyed by the rebels were being housed and the Iraqi Government was making efforts to build roads, schools, hospitals, etc, in the Kurdish areas. The Kurds had been offered all that they could possibly demand and many of them, who were more enlightened than the tribal followers of Barzani, accepted the Iraqi Government's terms and were co-operating fully. The problem was Iranian support which was motivated not by care for the Kurds but by Iran's interests elsewhere, notably in the Shatt al Arab.

4. I asked Shanshal if he could confirm the reports I had seen of Mulla Mustafa's death. He said that the Iraqis had no positive confirmation of this but there was a good deal of evidence to suggest that he was in fact dead. In particular the Kurdish radio had advertised that he would be giving a press conference on 5 December which would be broadcast. In the event, the questions and answers of what was allegedly the Mulla's press conference were read by an announcer. (221)

(202) 5. Before I left, Shanshal reverted to military co-operation and raised in particular the cases of Cymbeline (my Tel No 451 to the FCO) and the supply of 25 pounder ammunition (the Defence Attache's Tels Nos 160505 Nov and 050915 Dec to MODUK). I stressed that the delay in delivery of the Cymbeline was in part due to the fact that the equipment itself was extremely new, even in the hands of the British army, and was regarded by us still as secret. Nevertheless, I had reported the Iraqi Government's request for quicker delivery and would convey the reply as soon as I received it. As for the 25 pounder ammunition, I myself doubted whether we had any available, since the gun was no longer in use in the British army, but again the request had been forwarded by the Defence Attache and the reply would be conveyed when received. The Defence Attache made the point that we were providing Iraq with equipment under contracts already signed, or at an advanced stage, worth up to £200 million and Shanshal said that there was no reason, from Iraq's point of view, why this sum should not be greatly increased. I said that we would welcome such an increase since although we would find it impossible to supply some items of equipment - I instanced the Jaguar, - though Iraq is not in the market for that - there was a wide field in which I believed we would be willing to supply. (257)

6. I report this conversation as background. I will in fact be writing to the Department shortly about courses for the Iraqi Armed Forces.

Yanser
J. A. N. Graham

Copied to:

Chancery, Washington
Chancery, Tehran

J A N Graham

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(253)
NRK 10/1

RECEIVED
REGISTRATION
17 DEC 1974

NRK 10/1
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HD/MED
HD/DIFFERENCE D(2)

[files]

Mr. Burton - in Mr. Raftery's
absence can you pursue
this. *12/12*

FO 984/E 010/12

LKS 551.12

RR FCO

GRS 70

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 120525Z DEC

CONFIDENTIAL

TO ROUTINE FCO TELNO 476 OF 12 DECEMBER SAVING TEHRAN AND KUWAIT.

(221)

MY TELNO 451 : CYMBELINE

THE IRAQI C.G.S. RAISED THIS WITH ME YESTERDAY WHEN I PAID A COURTESY CALL ON HIM. THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IS AWAY FOR THE REST OF THIS WEEK BUT I HOPE I MAY BE IN A POSITION TO GIVE HIM A REPLY NEXT WEEK.

FCO PLEASE PASS SAVING TEHRAN AND KUWAIT.

GRAHAM

NNNN

Tel sent 18/12
HDS, a
M. Burton. R. 16/12.

Spoke to Mr. MacDonnell. He is gloomy about prospects. Mr. Brecher is briefing HDS. Mr. Mac will let us know soon.

~~Hughes~~
18/12/12
R

8011.12.74

see (263)

(254)

Mr. Clarke
Tel sent 15/12/74
Cymbeline For 129.

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY N 35

17 DEC 1974

NB 10/1

DS 13(b) - Mr Arthur Davis - informed me today that Sir Lester Suffield has now written to the VCDS asking if it will be possible to bring forward the delivery date as requested in Sir G. Arthur's letter of 4 December. Mr Davis ~~sees~~ sees little prospect of an answer before the end of this week, but estimates that there is a reasonable chance of a compromise decision by VCDS is an agreement to bring forward delivery by 3 months.

2. I attach a draft reply to Baghdad
tel 476 (log A)

15/12/74
10/12/74
fa



Department of Trade and Industry

Export Licensing Branch
Sanctuary Buildings 20 Great Smith Street London SW1P 3DB

Telex 27366 Answer Back DTIHQ London

Telegrams Advantage London SW1

Telephone 01-215 4229


(255)

P A Raftery Esq
Middle East Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London SW1

Your reference

Our reference 1A/4057/74

Date 16 December 1974



Dear Peter,

IRAQ: CYMBELINE

can't att'd.

Thank you for your letter of 11 December giving FCO clearance to the issue of a licence for the export of Cymbeline mortar locating radar to Iraq (1A/4057/74).

With regard to your second paragraph, I assume that the Ministry of Defence will be making the necessary arrangements to ensure that the equipment is not delivered to Iraq before the due contract date, as no condition to this effect can be imposed in the export licence and there is nothing legally to prevent export during the period of licence which will have to be submitted for renewal 12 months from the date of issue.

Personally, I find it regrettable that Article 19 of the contract ties it to the issue of the export licence rather than a condition that the UK Government will authorise the export from December, 1975.

I am fully conscious of the financial implications of issuing a licence at this time but I am not sure that this is quite the right way to do it.

Yours sincerely

D A Whitby

ps. I'll not issue the licence until I hear again from you

cc Defence Department
FCO
MOD DS13
" Sales 1

Reply sent 17/12 RV
18/12
P



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-

1.A. R 11/12 (35)
RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
12 DEC 1974

D A Whitby Esq
Department of Trade
Export Licensing Branch
Sanctuary Buildings

Your reference

Our reference ~~NBR 10/1~~ NBR 6/1

Date 11 December 1974

Dear Whirby,

CYMBELINE FOR IRAQ

1. I am writing with reference to export licence application IA/4057/74 of 15 October and our subsequent telephone conversation to confirm that there is no political objection to the export of the Cymbeline mortar locating radar to Iraq.
2. As I mentioned, the Ministry of Defence have told us that there are security restrictions attached to this equipment and for this reason delivery to Iraq is not allowed before December 1975 although they have agreed to the Iraqis taking delivery in this country in October for training purposes on condition that export will not take place until December. We understand that the manufacturers are aware of these conditions but they require an export licence to be issued as soon as possible so that they can complete their contractual arrangements with the Iraqis.

Yours sincerely,
P A Raftery
Middle East Department

cc: Defence Dept
MOD DS13
Sales 1, MOD

18/12
P

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

(256)

IMMEDIATE/ROUTINE 161715Z DEC

FROM MODUK
TO BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD
INFO FCO MED

TOP COPY

RECEIVED IN REGISTER No 35 17 DEC 1974
NBR 10/1

CONFIDENTIAL
DIG EBR

(?)

FROM SALES 1B PD MGB PD YOUR 160930Z DEC REFERS PD FAIREYS
REPLY IS AS FOLLOWS PD QUOTEE PD RELUCTANT TO EXTEND VALIDITY
OF CONTRACTS DUE TO OUR CURRENT COMMITMENTS ON SUPPLIERS PD
HOWEVER IN CIRCUMSTANCES IF WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED DOWN PAYMENT
AND LETTER OF CREDIT BY 23RD DEC YOU ARE AUTHORISED TO ADVISE
EXTENSION OF VALIDITY FOR FURTHER 15(FIFTEEN) DAYS PD PLEASE
DO NOT INDICATE IN ANY WAY THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO GRANT EXTEN-
SION UNTIL 23RD DECEMBER PD IN ADDITION YOU ARE AUTHORISED TO
SEND LETTER OF CONFIRMATION THAT THE BRIDGE AND ANCILLARY EQUIP-
MENT IS MANUFACTURED TO BRITISH ARMY SPECIFICATIONS AND IS SUB-
JECT TO SAME INSPECTION PROCEDURES PD FAIRY IS ALSO FULLY AUTHOR-
ISED TO PRODUCE AND MARKET THE BRIDGE OVERSEAS PD UNQUOTE PD
CAN CONFIRM LAST TWO SENTENCES CORRECT AND GRATEFUL YOU USE THIES
WORDING PD

BT

/SENT TO D C C/

FILES

MED
DEFENCE D
MR WEIR
MR THOMSON

18/12
Nob
pr

CONFIDENTIAL

0756


(257)

TO V574/E 05

LKS NR 587/17

OO MODUK

GRS 50



MOD DISTRIBUTION

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 170530Z DEC.

R E S T R I C T E D

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK TEL OF 17 DECEMBER 1974.

DIG EBK/EBR.
FROM DA.

SPARE PARTS FOR 25 POUNDER GUN MY EBK/EBR 160505Z NOV
AND 010730Z DEC REFERS.

1. I AM ABOUT TO BE SUMMONED FOR THE THIRD TIME BY
MOD WITH STILL NO ANSWER ON THIS,

2. CAN WE SUPPLY SPARE PARTS OR NOT ?

GRAHAM
BT

NNNN

MED

M. Boston

How does this stand?

728-7177 X-4005

J. 17/12

Tel sent by mod
on 17/12
18/12
P

(225)

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
(258)

CRS 550/2

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 170615Z DEC

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1974

TO ROUTINE MODUK TELNO 170615Z DEC/INFO ROUTINE FCO.

DIG EBR/LPE/FOH

Handwritten note: MAD. are following up. Applications for E.L.'s will follow in due course. 14/12/74

MODUK FOR DEFENCE SALES 1B, 2 AND 3. FCO FOR MED AND DEF DEPT.

FROM DA.

ENGR AND OTHER SALES TO IRAQ.

YOUR EBR/LPE TO BAGHDAD EARLY DEC NO DTG IS REF ALPHA.
MY EBR 160930Z DEC (NOT TO ALL) IS REF BRAVO.

(?)

ONE. COL ABDUL KARIM WHO LED RECENT ENGR PURCHASING MISSION TO UK CALLED ME TO MEETING TODAY.

TWO. HE EXPRESSED HIS THANKS FOR EXCELLENT VISIT AND ALL THAT HAD BEEN DONE FOR HIM.

THREE. DETAILS OF ACTION ON FAIREY CONTRACT FOR US DOLLARS TWENTY THREE MILLION FOR MGB AND AIRCRAFT LANDING MATS CONTRACT FOR UNKNOWN SUM IS CONTAINED IN REF BRAVO (WHAT IS CONTRACT WORTH).

FOUR. HE RAISED FOLLOWING POINTS

ALPHA. LAIRDS CLASS 16 BRIDGE IS NOT REQUIRED AT THE MOMENT.

CONFIDENTIAL

/ BRAVO.

CONFIDENTIAL

BR^{AVO}. LAIRDS CLASS 30 AND CLASS 60 TRACKWAY OFFER IS UNDER STUDY AND HE WILL GIVE ME ANSWER SOON.

CHARLIE. SCOTTISH AVIATIONS REVISED CONTRACT FOR BULLDOG AIRCRAFT HAS BEEN HANDED TO IAF.

DELTA. B^{ITAIN}-NORMANS OFFER FOR FOUR DEFENDERS FOR DELIVERY IN MARCH 75 PASSED TO IAF. THEY NOW AWAIT CONTRACT.

ECHO. FV180 COMBAT ENGINEER TRACTOR. HE WAS TOLD THIS WAS STILL UNDER DEVELOPMENT AND WOULD NOT BE AVAILABLE BEFORE 1977. THEY NEED IT VERY URGENTLY. ALTHOUGH CLEARANCE TO SUPPLY WAS AGREED AND I HAVE BEEN AWAITING QUOTATION (YOUR EBR/LPE 130845Z NOV REFERS) I DID NOT KNOW THAT IT WAS STILL UNDER DEVELOPMENT. WAS THIS A STALLING OPERATION ON OUR PART (LIKE CYMBELINE) OR IS THIS REALLY THE CASE?

FIVE. REF ALPHA DOES NOT CLARIFY WHAT EQUIPMENT HE ASKED FOR WAS OBSOLETE, OF FOREIGN ORIGIN OR THE ITEMS WHERE THE POSITION WAS NOT CLEAR CUT. PLEASE CLARIFY.

SIX. IRAQ'S ORIGINAL ENGR BID (OUR EBR 221010Z JUL REFERS) WAS RAISED AGAIN, AND HE MADE FOLLOWING POINTS :

ALPHA. HE GOT NO ANSWER ON THEIR REQUIREMENT FOR AN ASSAULT TANK. WHAT THEY NEEDED WAS A TANK CAPABLE OF CLEARING MINEFIELDS.

BR^{AVO}. WAS THERE A REPLACEMENT FOR THE GIANT OR BABY VIPERS.

CHARLIE HE WAS TOLD THE ANSWER ON REQUEST FOR MINELAYERS AND MINE EXPLODERS WOULD BE SENT TO ME.

DELTA. HE WANTED THE ANSWER ON REQUEST FOR PLASTIC MINE DETECTOR WHICH HE SAID YOU WOULD SEND TO ME.

SEVEN. HE SAID DIRECTOR OF ARMAMENTS AND SUPPLIES WOULD BE SEEING ME ON OTHER SUBJECTS FROM BOOTS TO SCORPION.

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EIGHT. MAY I PLEASE BE INFORMED OF VALUE OF CONTRACTS IN
2, 4B, 4C, 4D ABOVE.

NINE. LETTER FOLLOWS GIVING DETAILS OF RECENT DEFENCE SALES-
MENS VISITS.

TEN. I WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE REACTION TO MY DA/31 LETTER
OF 21 NOV 74 ON DEFENCE SALES TO MDS1.

GRAHAM

BT

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

F I L E S
MED
DEFENCE D
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR
MR THOMSON

CONFIDENTIAL

PRODROME LONDON

PROCEXECSTU LDN

UU

RR

DE RBDTPL

ZNR UUUUU

R 170848Z DEC

FM MODUK PE

TO BRITDEFAT AMMAN

BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD

INFO ZEN/FCO LONDON

BT

UNCLAS

FROM SALES 1B/SS. FCO FOR NANAD AND MED. 7

ROYAL ENGINEERS DEMONSTRATION 8-10 JULY 1974. GRATEFUL IF YOU WILL

PROVIDE FULL NAMES AND TITLES OF SUITABLE JORDANIAN AND IRAQI


OFFICERS WHOM MOD MIGHT POSSIBLY INVITE. ALTHOUGH THIS IS A NON SALES

DEMO, WHICH OCCURS EVERY 2 YEARS, MOST MAIN ENGINEER EQUIPMENTS

WHICH WE OFFER FOR SALE WILL BE ON DISPLAY. PLEASE REPLY BY 31 DEC.

BT

C VA OF SUITABLE



(259)

Hd of MED

Hd of NANAD

Hd of Defence (2)

Xerox 3

(Filer)

M. D. S. 17/12

17/12
pa

GRS 70

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
(260)

DESKBY 171400Z DEC
IMMEDIATE

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 170945Z DEC

CONFIDENTIAL



DESKBY 171400Z DEC

TO IMMEDIATE FCO TELNO 480 OF 17 DECEMBER. 1974

(253)
(212) MYTEL NO. 476 : CYMBELINE

15/11/74
pa

PLEASE SEE THE DEFENCE ATTACHE'S TEL 170945Z DEC. (EBR/OGU).

SINCE THE PRESENT CONTRACT LAPSES ON 31 DECEMBER THE IRAQIS ARE BAFFLED BY THE DELAY IN ISSUING THE LICENCE AND I CONFESS THAT I SHARE THEIR BEWILDERMENT. I SHOULD ALSO BE GRATEFUL FOR ADVICE IN WHAT REPLY I CAN GIVE TO THE MINISTER'S REQUEST FOR ACCELERATION WHICH IS NOW 3 WEEKS OLD.

GRAHAM

FILES:

MED
DEFENCE DEPT
MR. CAMPBELL
MR. WEIR
SIR G. ARTHUR
MR. THOMSON

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

(261)

OTHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 170950Z DEC

CONFIDENTIAL

DESKBY 171400Z DEC

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK TELNO 170945Z DEC⁷⁴/INFO PRIORITY FCO.
DIG EBR/OGU

FROM DA FOR MDS 1.

CYMBELINE.

OUR TELNO 451 OF 27 NOVEMBER TO FCO IS REF A

(232) EBR/OGU 050958Z DEC IS REF B.

1. I WAS AGAIN CALLED TO SEE DIRECTOR OF ARMAMENTS AND
SUPPLIES ON THIS SUBJECT THIS MORNING.

2. HE SAID DESPITE THE FACT HMG HAD AGREED TO GRANT AN
EXPORT LICENCE THEY HAD STILL NOT RECEIVED NOTIFICATION
FROM EMI OF GRANTING OF LICENCE AND THEREFORE THEY COULD NOT
ISSUE THE LETTER OF CREDIT. THEY HAD ASKED THROUGH THEIR MA
IN LONDON FOR EMI REP TO COME OUT URGENTLY TO DISCUSS TRAINING
BUT HAD AS YET NO RESPONSE.

3. THE CONTRACT DEADLINE IS 31 DECEMBER WHICH IS ALSO END OF
IRAQ FINANCIAL YEAR.

4. DOES EMI KNOW HMG WILL ISSUE IMMEDIATE EXPORT LICENCE
AND CAN EMI REP COME OUT. IF HE CAN HE SHOULD SEE ME
BEFORE HE GOES TO MOD.

5. MAY I HAVE A REPLY TO REF B.

GRAHAM

[SENT TO D C C]

FILES

MED

DEF D

MR CAMPBELL

MR WEIR

MR THOMSON

SIR G ARTHUR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

(262)

0 RS 160/2


PRIORITY
CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 171000Z DEC

CONFIDENTIAL

1974

TO PRIORITY MODUK TELNO 171000Z DEC/INFO ROUTINE FCO.



DIG OYP/LPE

(240) FROM DA FOR SALES SUPPLY ONE 25 POUNDER AMMO AND SPARES.

YOUR OYP/LPE 110900Z DEC IS REF A

18/12
10

(241) FCO TEL 335 OF 111820Z DEC IS REF B

1. CONTENTS OF REFS PASSED TO DIRECTOR OF ARMAMENTS AND SUPPLIES TODAY.

2. HE WILL LET ME KNOW TOTAL REQUIREMENT FOR SMOKE AND ILLUMINATING SHELLS SHORTLY.

3. I WAS AGAIN ASKED FOR AN ANSWER ON 25 POUNDER SPARES WHICH I WAS UNABLE TO GIVE.

Ref sent
to MOD
11/12

4. THEY HAVE BEEN TRYING TO GET REP FROM COGSWELL AND HARRISON TO FLY OUT TO BAGHDAD TO DISCUSS CONTRACT FOR 2 WEEKS. VISA AUTHORITY IS AT IRAQI EMBASSY. PLEASE RING COGSWELLS AND ASK IF THEY ARE SENDING REP.

GRAHAM

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

FILES
MED
DEFENCE D
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR
MR THOMSON


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(263)

GRS 50A
PRIORITY
CYPHER CAT A



FM FCO 171055Z

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY BAGHDAD TELNO 344 OF 17 DEC.1974
YOUR TELNO 476: CYMBELINE

1. WE ARE DOING OUR BEST TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT TO THE ADVANCE OF
THE DELIVERY DATE BUT REGRET THAT WE ARE UNLIKELY TO HAVE A
DECISION BEFORE THE WEEK BEGINNING 23 DECEMBER AT THE EARLIEST.

CALLAGHAN

18/12
pa
h2 1 week

FILES

MED
DEFENCE D
MR CAMPBELL
MR WEIR
SIR G ARTHUR
MR THOMSON

CONFIDENTIAL



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1A 2AL

Telephone 01-



D A Whitby Esq
Department of Trade
Export Licence Branch
Sanctuary Buildings

Your reference

Our reference

Date 17 December 1974

Dear Whitby,

IRAQ: CYMBELINE

(255) 18/12

1. Thank you for your letter of 16 December to Peter Raftery who is on leave.
2. I confirm that we have no objection to the issue of an export licence for the export of the Cymbeline mortar locating radar to Iraq and should be grateful if you would now issue the licence to EMI.
3. I understand that DS13 MOD are replying separately on the question of the principle involved.

yours sincerely

G S Burton
Middle East Department

cc: Defence Department
MOD DS13
Sales 1 DS13

VV

UNCLASSIFIED

DFA130 17/1714 351C2996

FOR DFA

ROUTINE/ROUTINE 170848Z DEC

FROM MODUK PE
TO BRITDEFAT AMMAN
BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD
INFO FCO LONDON

RECEIVED IN ENTRY No 35 18 DEC 1974 NBR 101
--

716
ADVANCE COPY

Menad
MED

NO DISTRIBUTION

UNCLASSIFIED

FROM SALES 1B/SS. FCO FOR NANAD AND MED.

ROYAL ENGINEERS DEMONSTRATION 8-10 JULY 1974. GRATEFUL IF YOU WILL
PROVIDE FULL NAMES AND TITLES OF SUITABLE JORDANIAN AND IRAQI

~~DEMU~~

~~DEMU~~ OFFICERS WHOM MOD MIGHT POSSIBLY INVITE. ALTHOUGH THIS IS A NO
SALES

DEMO, WHICH OCCURS EVERY 2 YEARS, MOST MAIN ENGINEER EQUIPMENTS
WHICH WE OFFER FOR SALE WILL BE ON DISPLAY. PLEASE REPLY BY 31 DEC.
BT

RR JEDDA

RR KUWAIT

RR BAGHDAD

GRS 160

CYPHER CAT A

FM TEHRAN 180720Z

IMMEDIATE

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 18 DEC 1974 NBE 10/1
--

ADVANCE COPY

*Mr. Campbell.
Sir G. Arthur
Mr. Weir
Hd. M&D
Hd. D&D (2)
Hd. W&D*

(Files)

CONFIDENTIAL

TO IMMEDIATE F C O TELNO 694 OF 18 DEC, INFO ROUTINE JEDDA,
KUWAIT AND BAGHDAD.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO 526: ARMS SALES TO IRAQ

1. I SPOKE TO ALAM ON 17 DECEMBER. I REMINDED HIM OF
THE SHAH'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS THIS SUBJECT WHEN I HAD
RAISED IT ON PREVIOUS OCCASIONS, AND SAID THAT THE IRAQIS
WERE NOW INTERESTED IN HELICOPTERS. HOWEVER WE WOULD NOT
PROVIDE MISSILES. I ADDED THAT I ASSUMED THAT THE SHAH'S
ATTITUDE WOULD BE THE SAME. ALAM AGREED.

2. UNLESS I HEAR TO THE CONTRARY BY THE WEEKEND, I THINK
WE CAN TAKE IT THAT THE SHAH WILL NOT REACT ADVERSELY.
I DELIBERATELY PHRASED MY REMARKS IN SUCH A WAY AS TO GIVE
THE IMPRESSION THAT WE HAD NO DOUBT ABOUT THE SHAH'S
ATTITUDE, BUT THAT WE REGARDED IT AS OUR DUTY AS AN ALLY
TO KEEP THE SHAH INFORMED OF IMPORTANT ENQUIRIES FROM THE
IRAQIS.

PARSONS

NNNN

266

2054/18

BU 23-1274

*1871
pa*

267

RESTRICTED 19 DEC 1974

CWY008 17/1825 351A3290

FOR CWV

IMMEDIATE 171810Z DEC

FROM MODUK ARMY
TO BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD

RESTRICTED

DIG RTT

TO GRAHAM BRITDEFAT FROM SALES SUPPLY 1D LONDON.

APOLOGIES FOR DELAY IN REPLYING. REGRET WE ARE UNABLE TO GIVE
DETAILS ON SUPPLY OF 25 POUNDER SPARES UNLESS ITEMIZED AS THESE
WOULD COME FROM BRITISH ARMY STOCK. HOWEVER WE SENT AN OFFER
OF 25 POUNDER SPARES WE ARE PREPARED TO SUPPLY TO THE IRAQ
EMBASSY ON 10 DECEMBER 1974

BT

BRUSSELS.

DISTRIBUTION

CWV -1 - SALES SUPPLY 1D
CWV 1 SALES 1D GROSSMAN
ZIC 1 INT SVC

1229110
(268)

DFA081 18/1227 352A1600

FO DFA

MOD DETENTION

ROUTINE/ROUTINE 180930Z DEC

MED

FROM MODUK ARMY
TO BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD
INFO FCO LONDON

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 19 DEC 1974 NBR 10/1
--

Mr. B. [unclear] 17/12
[unclear] 12/12

R E S T R I C T E D

DIG OYP/LPE

FCO FOR IRAQ DESK

FOR DA FROM SALES SUPPLY ONE D. YOUR 171000Z REFERS. HAVE SPOKEN

COGSWELL AND HARRISON. THEY SAY FORMAL OFFER MADE AND SIGNED BY THEM IN LONDON. THIS TAKEN TO IRAQ FOR SIGNING. THEY WERE INFORMED THAT THEY WOULD BE INFORMED WHEN SIGNED. AM ASSURED THEY HAVE HEARD NOTHING FURTHER AND MOST CERTAINLY NOT REPEAT NOT BEEN REQUESTED TO GO TO BAGHDAD. COULD YOU PASS THIS GENTLY TO PERSONS CONCERNED PLEASE

BT

MOD DISTRIBUTION

269

FO 58/18
E 88/18

MED

LKS 606/18

PP MODUK

GRS 500

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY No 35
19 DEC 1974

NR 10/1

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 180830Z DEC

PRIORITY

CONFIDENTIAL

TO PRIORITY MODUK TELNO 180830Z DEC.

DIG EBK/EBR

FM DA FOR DIRECTOR OF SALES SUPPLY INFO DIRECTOR OF SALES
ONE.

25 POUNDER SPARES FOR IRAQ

MY EBK/EBR 160505Z NOV IS REF A

MY EBK/EBR 010730Z DEC IS REF B

MY EBK/EBR 170530Z DEC IS REF C

SALES ID RTT 171810Z DEC IS REF D

ONE. PLEASE INFO SALES ID JOHN GRAHAM IS AMBASSADOR NOT DA.

DA IS SANDERS.

TWO. HAVING WAITED FOUR AND A HALF WEEKS FOR ANSWER ON THIS
DURING WHICH REFS A TO C WERE SENT AND APART FROM BEING CALLED
THREE TIMES OFFICIALLY TO MOD FOR AN ANSWER THE SUBJECT
HAS BEEN BROUGHT UP WITH MONOTONOUS REGULARITY BY
MOD ON EVERY OTHER OCCASION I HAVE BEEN THERE.

MOD ON EVERY OTHER OCCASION I HAVE BEEN THERE.

THREE. REF D TELLS ME SALES SUPPLY 1D PASSED LIST OF SPARES WE ARE PREPARED TO SUPPLY IRAQ TO IRAQ EMBASSY ON 10 DEC WITHOUT COPYING TO ME. HOWEVER SALES SUPPLY 1D ARE UNABLE TO GIVE DETAILS TO ME ON SUPPLY OF 25 POUNDER SPARES UNLESS ITEMISED.

FOUR. WE ARE DEALING WITH A MARKET WHICH CURRENTLY HAS SIGNED CONTRACTS OR ARE NEGOTIATING FOR DEFENCE EQPT TO THE VALUE OF £188 .M (PUNDS STERLING ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY EIGHT MILLION). IT IS APPRECIATED HERE THAT YOU MAY ON OCCASIONS BE UNABLE TO RESPOND AS QUICKLY AS YOU WOULD LIKE BUT ON THIS OCCASION I AM BAFFLED BY A RESPONSE WHICH MAKES US AT THIS END LOOK TARDY AND INEFFICIENT.


FIVE. I HAVE NOW INFORMED IRAQ MOD WE CAN SUPPLY SPARES AND TO PREPARE A LIST OF SPARES THEY NEED. THEY HAVE NOT YET RECEIVED THE LIST YOU SENT TO IRAQ EMBASSY BUT THIS IS NOT SURPRISING IN VIEW OF THEIR NOTORIOUS REPUTATION FOR INEFFICIENCY. THEY HAVE ASKED ME FOR ANOTHER COPY OF THE LIST TO ENABLE THEM TO PREPARE THEIR DEMAND. PLEASE DESPATCH.

GRAHAM

BT

NNNN

Mr Weir



252

THE IRAQ ARMED FORCES

NR b1

I attach a draft reply to Mr Graham's letter of 10 December.
Defence Department concur with the line on training.

T J Clark
Middle East Department

19 December 1974

for reply as per
- see (281)

CONFIDENTIAL

Registry

o.

DRAFT letter

Type 1 +

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

Top Secret.
Secret.
Confidential.
Restricted.
Unclassified.

To:-

HE
Mr J A N Graham CMG
BAGHDAD

From

Mr Weir

Telephone No. Ext.

Department

PRIVACY MARKING

..... In Confidence

THE IRAQ ARMED FORCES

1. Thank you very much for your letter of 10 December reporting what was clearly a most useful call on General Shanshal.
2. I fear as Geoffrey Arthur said in his letter of 12 December to you about arms sales that the whole question of sales to Iraq together with the training of their military personnel in the UK will regularly pose problems which will test to the utmost the strength or otherwise of our bilateral relations. You took, if I may say so, an admirable line on each of the three issues Shanshal raised, ie pamphlets, training and sales. I understand from the Ministry of Defence that the supply of pamphlets has increased and we, from here, are certainly pushing for the Iraqis to be awarded as many places as possible on training courses. They will of course be frequently disappointed and frustrated since all courses are over-subscribed to a very large degree and even given our new-found relationship with the Iraqis and their enormous commercial potential it is difficult to recommend priority for Iraqi applications over those from other more friendly and traditionally allied nations. We shall continue to treat arms sales applications on their merits and you will have

/now

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

n. seen that an export licence has been granted to EMI for Cymbeline. I hope by the time you receive this we shall have been able to telegraph you with a decision on the delivery dates for Cymbeline.

3. In the meantime I realise that you are very much in the hot seat at your end and can only say that we will do our best to ensure that all Iraqi enquiries, even if the reply turns out to be negative, are dealt with as speedily as possible.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation Sales 1b


Stuart House 23 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ

Telex 23605

Telephone ~~01 427 9288 ext.~~

Direct Line 01 632 4709

Switchboard 01 632 3333



Miss M McIntosh
Defence Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London SW1

Your reference

Our reference

D/Sales/113/18/1

Date

12th August 1974

Dear Miss McIntosh

ARMS WORKING PARTY CLEARANCES

May we please have an indication of your Department's view to the release of the equipment described below?

- | | | |
|---|-------------------------|---|
| 1 | Country | Iraq |
| 2 | Description | LYNX helicopters - troop carrying version |
| 3 | Security Classification | Unclassified |
| 4 | Value of sale | 40 at £450,000 each with spares at least £20 million. |
| 5 | Further information | The helicopter is made by Westlands but is part of an Anglo-French project. |

I am copying this letter to other members of the AWP.

Yours sincerely

H. Cameron

Copies to: Mr H R Braden
Mr M Esau
Mr W P Cassell
Mr P T Durnell
Lt Col C W A Napier

- DS13
- DS13
- Treasury
- DTI (EPB)
- DPS(C Team)

*Letter sent by
Miss McIntosh
15/9/74
pa*



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation Sales 1b


Stuart House 23 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ

Telex 23605

Telephone 01-437 9288 ext.

Direct Line 01-632 4709

Switchboard 632 3333



(2-12)

Miss M R McIntosh
Defence Department
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London SW1

Your reference

Our reference

D/Sales/113/18/1

Date D/Sales/113/81/1

16 October 1974

Dear *Miss McIntosh*

ARMS WORKING PARTY CLEARANCES

Could we have an indication of your Department's view to the sale of the aircraft described below please?

- 1 Country: Iraq
- 2 Description of aircraft: GAZELLE A high performance lightweight helicopter for use in military reconnaissance, artillery observation, troop and supply transport and casualty evacuation roles.
- 3 Security classification of equipment: UNCLASSIFIED (basic airframe and engine)
- 4 Further information: Our Defence Attaché in Baghdad has informed us that the Director of Supply, IAF, has expressed interest in Gazelle and Lynx, both of which are manufactured by Westland-Aerospatiale. You will recall that we have already raised a request in respect of Lynx, following an approach from Westland, (our letter of 12 August refers).

I am copying this letter to the other members of the AWP.

Yours sincerely
D A Grossman
D A Grossman

*MacIntosh and this has now arrived signed
you send confirmation*

*Lt Burton: spoken Min
Mr. Williams
MRJ*

Copies to: Mr H R Braden - DS13
Mr M J Esau - DS13b
Mr I McCall - DS13c
Mr W P Cassell - Treasury
Mr P T Durnell - DoT (EPB)
Lt Col C W A Napier - DPS (Cteam)

*Letter sent by Miss McIntosh 18/11/74
see NBR10/1 (1975) folio (3)*

*See spoke - copies
2 mod letters received*

*Miss McIntosh
3. 1. 75*

RR MODUK ✓

GRS ~~EDD~~

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 170645Z DEC

RESTRICTED

TO ROUTINE MODUK TELNO 170645Z DEC.

DIG EBR/LPE

FROM DA FOR MDS 1

EQPT FOR IRAQI NAVY AND DEFENCE SALES CATALOGUE.

MY EBR/LPE 130445Z NOV IS REF ALPHA.

YOUR EBR/LPE 191405Z NOV IS REF BRAVO.

ONE. HAS ANY ACTION BEEN TAKEN IN RESPONSE TO PARA ONE ALPHA OF REF ALPHA AND PARA ONE ALPHA OF REF BRAVO INFORMING COMPANIES OF POTENTIAL FOR SALE OF EQPT TO IRAQ NAVY, NOW YOU HAVE RECEIVED MY LETTER.


TWO. BOTH IAF AND IRAQ ARMY HAVE COPIES OF DEFENCE SALES CATALOGUE (DSC) FOR THIS YEAR AND WANT MORE. AN IRAQI OFFICER RETURNED FROM UK THE OTHER DAY WITH HIS OWN UP-TO-DATE COPY.

THREE. WITHOUT DSC WE MIGHT NOT HAVE SECURE CONTRACTS FOR MGB (£9M) NIGHT VISION EQPT (£26M) AND A HOST OF MINOR EQPT.

FOUR. AS IAF AND ARMY HAVE COPIES IT SEEMS RATHER POINTLESS NOT SUPPLYING NAVY WITH A COPY.

FIVE. THE BENEFITS TO US OF SUPPLYING DSC SEEM FAR TO EXCEED THE DISADVANTAGES OF OCCASIONALLY SAYING NO TO IRAQI REQUESTS.

SIX. PLEASE RECONSIDER YOUR DECISION AND IF YOU AGREE SEND A FURTHER SIX COPIES OF DSC.



(273)

MOD DISTRIBUTION

MED

W. B. 17/12
19

17/12

SIX. PLEASE RECONSIDER YOUR DECISION AND IF YOU AGREE SEND
A FURTHER SIX COPIES OF DSC.

GRAHAM
BT


SENT TO DCC

NNNN

EXPORT CREDITS GUARANTEE DEPARTMENT

Box No 272 Aldermanbury House Aldermanbury London EC2P 2EL

Telex 883601 Telephone 01-606 6699



I E Rich Esq
H M Treasury
Great George Street
LONDON SW1P 3AG

Your reference


2P(E) 17-180-01

Our reference

SP/A/44401/8167

Date

17 December 1974



Dear

MOBILE RUNWAY FOR IRAQ

I refer to your letter of 19 July where you agreed the request in David Jaffray's letter of 15 July 1974. Fairey Engineering now inform us that the goods were two runways and that with escalation the total contract price is now £6.4m. The terms are revised to 30% within 30 days of contracts, 50% cash against documents and 20% 60 days after shipment at 6 to 32 months from date of contract.

We would be grateful to have your approval of this increased value and revised terms of payment.


Yours sincerely

J W Pannell

cc	G M Lambert	BOE
	T J Wilshire	ODA
	S N Chilton	DOT
	E R C Holland	FCO
	R J Sanders	MOD
	A A Sapsted	} ECGD
	J W Coggins	

cc DEF. DEPT.


M.E.D.



ENCLAIR

FM BAGHDAD 190900Z DEC.

UNCLASSIFIED



(275)

TOP COPY

TO ROUTINE MODUK TEL OF 19 DECEMBER 1974, INFO
ROUTINE FCO.

YOUR TEL NO DIG 170848Z DEC.

FOR SALES IB/SS FROM DA

1. IRAQIS WOULD CERTAINLY WANT TO ATEND IF INVITED AND
IN VIEW OF THEIR CURRENT BUYING SPREE AND MORE THAN
ADEQUATE SUPPLIES OF MONEY SALES WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY
FOLLOW.
2. INVITATIONS SHOULD BE SENT EITHER TO ME OR TO DIRECTOR
OF TRAINING AND TECHNICAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE. MOD BAGHDAD
AND SHOULD INCLUDE

MAJ GEN ADNAN AHMAD ABDUL TALIL DCGS.

MAJ GEN MUHAMMAD TAYYIB DAUD KASHMUR DCGS

BRIG TARIQ AL TAWFIQ DMT

BRIG HAMID SAID AL ASADI DIR OF ENGRS

COL OSAMA DIR OF ARMAMENTS AND SUPPLIES

MAJ GEN JENAB AMIN DIR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

COMD SCHOOL OF ENGINEERING NAME NOT KNOWN

COL ABDUL KAREM ENGR STAFF.

3. WOULD ALSO ADVISE SENDING ~~SOME BLANK INVITATIONS.~~

4. NO DECISION OF FINAL COMPOSITION OF PARTY WOULD
BE MADE UNTIL LAST MINUTE AND WOULD INEVITABLY HAVE TO
INCLUDE ODD BAATH PARTY OFFICER TO WATCH THE OTHERS.

5. SEE ALSO MY LETTER DA/27 OF 5 DEC TO FLS(A) ON
VISITS FOR IRAQ ARMY 1975.

GRAHAM

FILES

MED

DEF D


MR CAMP BELL

MR WEIR

MR THOMSON

(276)

TOP COPY



CYPHER CAT A

PRIORITY/ROUTINE 191645Z DEC 1974

FROM MODUK
TO BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD
INFO FCO LONDON

C O N F I D E N T I A L

DIG EBR

FROM SALES 1B. CYMBELINE. YOUR 050958 AND 170950 REFER. CAN ASSURE
YOU THAT MOD, FCO, DOT, AND EMI ALL AWARE OF IMPORTANCE OF ISSUE
OF EXPORT LICENCE UPON WHICH WE AWAIT EXPORT LICENCE BRANCHES
DECISION. QUESTION OF FURTHER IMPROVED DELIVERY NOW WITH VCGS.
WILL ADVISE YOU OF OUT TURN OF BOTH DECISIONS WHEN KNOWN

F I L E S

MED
DEFENCE D

CONFIDENTIAL

CYRHER CAT A


FROM MODUK

TO BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD

INFO FCO MED

CONFIDENTIAL

DIG EBR



TOP COPY

FROM SALES 1B. DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ. RE YOUR 170615Z DEC.

1. COMBAT ENGINEER TRACTOR. CAN CONFIRM STILL UNDERGOING PROTOTYPE TRIALS. FOR YOUR INFO, ACCEPTANCE FOR BRITISH ARMY SERVICE EXPECTED JULY 1975. PRODUCTION LEAD TIME ABOUT TWO AND ONE HALF YEARS AND OUR FIRST DIVISION EXPECTED TO BE EQUIPED BY MAY 1978. YOU SHOULD APPRECIATE THAT PROVISION OF PRODUCTION STANDARD QUOTATION EVEN AT 1974 PRICES IS A COMPLEX TASK.
2. YOUR PARA 5. 25 PDR AMMO OBSOLETE (SEE SALES SUPPLY 1D SIGNAL 110900Z DEC). 4 POINT 2 INCH MORTAR AMMO AND 75MM AMMO BOTH USA MANUFACTURE. AP MINES, MINE AND BOOBY TRAP ACCESSORIES, TRACKED APC AND SCORPION FALL INTO QUOTE NOT CLEAR CUT UNQUOTE CATEGORY.
3. YOUR PARA 6 REFERS. ALPHA. SUCH A TANK DOES NOT EXIST. WORLD WAR TWO FLAIL TANK RENDERED OBSOLETE SEVERAL DECADES AGO BY DOUBLE IMPULSE FUSE. THIS WAS EXPLAINED TO COL ABDUL. BRAVO. NO KNOWN ALTERNATIVES TO VIPERS. POSITION AS STATED IN OUR 060930Z AUG. CHARLIE. POSITION IS AS STATED IN OUR 031310 AND 070944Z OCT IE MINELAYER NOT FOR SALE TO IRAQ AND MINE EXPLODER OBSOLETE. DELTA. WHEN COL ABDUL WAS IN UK HE WAS TOLD NOTHING AVAILABLE TO MEET HIS PARTICULAR REQUIEMENTS. THIS IS TRUE, HOWEVER AM NOW CHECKING ON COMMERCIAL DEVICE WHICH MIGHT BE OF INTEREST TO HIM. WILL ADVISE FURTHER IN DUE COURSE. GRATEFUL YOU SAY NOTHING YET.
4. YOUR PARA 8. PREMATURE TO TALK OF CONTRACTS. VALUE OF OFFERS REPEAT OFERS AS FOLLOWS. AIRFIELD LANDING MAT 6 POINT 4 MILLION STERLING. LAIRD TRACKWAY QUARTER MILLION STERING APPROX. SCOTTISH AVIATION GAVE ONLY AN INDICATIVE PRICE UPDATE ON THEIR MAY 74 QUOTATION, VALUE OF OFFER FOR 9 ARMED BULLDOG COULD BE IN ORDER OF FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND STERLING DEPENDING ON WHAT IAF ASK FOR. BRITTEN NORMAN SAY THEY ONLY SUBMITTED OUTLINE PROPOSALS AS PART OF EXPLORATORY OPERATION IN MARKETING DEFENDER. OFFER WAS FOR VARIOUS QUANTITIES. FIRM NOT PREPARED TO INDICATE POSSIBLE VALUE AT THIS EARLY STAGE.
5. D SALES 1 REPLYING TO YOUR DA/31 LETTER SHORTLY

FILES

MED

DEF. ID

MR WEIR

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL


D/HDS/1/24

(278)

VCGS

Copies to:

DMO
DMAO
DOR1(A)
DOR2(A)
Head of DIS(CS)
BGS(Int)DIS
AT 1(F & C)
RMIES Members <
MDS2



Min McIntosh

see MED.

Enter

Jan Burt

23/12

The wheels turn slowly 18 1/2

20/12

CYMBELINE TO IRAQ

In September 1974 the Release of Military Information Equipment and Training Sub-Committee agreed to the sale of Cymbeline Mk 1 to Iraq provided that delivery was not made before the last quarter of 1976. In October 1974 it was agreed (GS(OR)1 Sy - 4/57/0'Seas/1106 of 14th October 1974) that delivery could be advanced to December 1975 and that training could be given to Iraqis on equipment delivered for Iraq in this country in October 1975.

The December 1975 delivery date was based on the 18 month guide-line being applied to the delivery of Cymbeline Mk 1 to Egypt in July 1974.

The attached letter from Sir Geoffrey Arthur together with FCO telegram No 451 indicates that political pressure is again building up and we are being asked once more to re-examine our security stance on Cymbeline.

As this equipment only concerns the Army Department and you were directly concerned with the release of Cymbeline to Egypt I felt that I should seek your views on the FCO proposals rather than put them to the 2 Star Group of the RMIPC particularly as we are not concerned with the principle of release but with the date.

As you know the 18 month guide-line is normally used to indicate the timescale in which we could expect our equipment to be compromised once it has been deployed by British Service Units. In this instance the 18 month rule is being applied with deliveries to Egypt as the base line and I doubt whether the 18 month rule has very much validity against that background. We are in fact, I think, faced in this case with a purely political argument.

/The

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
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The political repercussions of refusing to deliver Cymbeline to Iraq before December 1975 might well outweigh the very doubtful security advantages which we might retain by delaying the sale to Iraq for 18 months after the Egyptians have received the equipment. I should be grateful if you could look at the security position with a view to a possible advance in the delivery date to say June/July 1975.

The production problem involved in advancing deliveries is of course another aspect to be considered and any deliveries to Iraq would have to be conditional upon there being no detriment to deliveries of equipment to the British Services.

It is only fair to say that an improvement in delivery date is almost bound to result in a request for earlier training to be provided and I am sure this will present problems of its own. However this may be a matter which our staffs can resolve if you are agreeable in principle to the earlier delivery.

12th December 1974



Head of Defence Sales

CONFIDENTIAL



AUS (S) "

MD/HDS

D/MRlg.
MSSla

Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

6 DEC 1974 / 94

(1)

MD/AS 130

CONFIDENTIAL

Would you please provide
a draft reply for HDS?

4 December, 1974.

Dear Lester, KG PS/HDS
6/12

I am writing to you about the sale of the Cymbeline mortar locating radar to Iraq, which has as you know become a problem because of MOD security limitations on delivery. As the matter seems likely to become a source of political difficulty in our relations with Iraq, I consider that we should try to do something to ease the problem following the Iraqi Foreign Minister's latest representations (Baghdad telegram No. 451 of 27 November, a copy of which you have seen) that we should advance the present delivery date (December 1975) by 6 months.

2. When we consulted our Ministers on this matter in October, their view was that the equipment could reasonably be supplied to Iraq 9 months after the delivery to Egypt, which I believe took place in September this year. We would therefore have no political objection to the delivery of Cymbeline to Iraq in June 1975, which just about coincides with the accelerated delivery requested by their Foreign Minister.

3. However, the security factor remains the nub of the problem. This is something for the MOD to assess, but I seriously question whether the security of Cymbeline for a few more months is of such importance that we should allow it to become a bone of contention between us and the Iraqis.

4. I should be grateful therefore if you would arrange as a matter of urgency for the case to be re-examined within the Ministry of Defence in the light of the latest representation from the Iraq Foreign Minister with a view to bringing forward the security limitation on delivery to June 1975.

Yours son,
Geoffrey Arthur

(Geoffrey Arthur)

Sir Lester Suffield,
Head of Defence Sales,
Ministry of Defence.

5/12/74

11/12/72

CONFIDENTIAL

To me please. I think
Sir G. Arthur (FCO) will be writing to you
to ask if you can give the security
limitations lifted. If you agree I
will provide a date minutes for...

Mr. BLANDEN
With the complicity of
Middle East
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
DS13.

Mr. Grossmith (Sales 1b) has checked with
E.M.I. Their delivery programme is governed by
a large scale to South Africa which has been
proven pending a policy decision by H.M.I. If
the scale is allowed, E.M.I. will not be able to
improve on the Iraqi delivery of December 1975

2 DEC 1974 / 12
Kedox + 1

Anyway: even if the SA scale were
banned, delivery could only be
brought forward to August or the
last year. Said any a decision on SA
will be referred to the members of the
committee. Nothing more to be done
to them.

Mr. R. [unclear]
[unclear] decisions.

DEFENCE COPY
HD MED

CONFIDENTIAL
TOP PRIORITY FCO TEL NO 4451
OF 27 NOVEMBER SAVING TEHRAN AND KUWAIT
BY TEL NO 4451: CYMBELINE
TEHRAN AND KUWAIT

I WAS INVITED TO CALL TODAY BY THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, [unclear], ON WHOM I HAVE NOT YET CALLED SINCE HE MOVED
FROM THE MINISTRY OF OIL. HE MADE IT CLEAR AT ONCE THAT THIS
WAS NOT MERELY A COURTESY FIRST CALL BY LAUNCHING STRAIGHT
INTO A PLEA THAT HMG SHOULD RECONSIDER THE DELAY OVER THE
SUPPLY OF CYMBELINE. THE IRAQI ARMED FORCES WERE IN URGENT NEED
OF IT AND THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF HMG COULD
PERMIT SUPPLY SIX MONTHS EARLIER: INDEED ANY ACCELERATION
WOULD BE WELCOME. I UNDERTOOK TO REPORT THIS TO YOU AND TO
CONVEY YOUR REPLY.

THE 17th AIRBORNE DIVISION WILL BE AWARE THAT THIS EQUIPMENT
IS BEING SUPPLIED TO THE EGYPTIAN ARMY AND THIS OF COURSE
MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR US TO SUPPLY THEM TO GAZA.
THEY ARE USING THE EQUIPMENT FOR THEIR OWN USE AND ARE
NOT ALLOWING US TO USE IT ON E.G. TO INDIAN. I AM SORRY TO HAVE TO
TALK TO YOU ON THIS BUT A CRISIS OF EVEN 3 MONTHS
WILL BE A RELIEF, I THINK, IF WELL RECEIVED HERE.

We aimed to
cancel this
we this argument
became egg
is a lawsuit
from

IT WOULD BE HELD IN ARGUMENT THIS IF I COULD BE BELIEVED
ON THE CONTRACTOR'S DELAY AND IF GIVEN SOME INDICATION OF
THE ACTIVITY CONTINUATION YOU HAVE IN MIND. IF THE SORRY
I THINK THE EQUIPMENT WILL BE PASSED ON, IT WOULD BE
WORTH TRYING TO OBTAIN INFORMATION FROM THE FRANCHISE ABOUT
THIS.

It is all over that
is the main
seemingly wrong.

FOR PLEASE PASS ON THE INFORMATION AND ADVISE.

These five copies to

Mr. Braden MOD DS13

and Mr. Mr. Donald Director MOD Sales 1

Thank you.

LH 384E



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

Defence Sales Organisation

Stuart House 23 Soho Square London W1V 5FJ

Telex 23605

Direct line 01-632

Switchboard 01-632 3333

Er PA (218A)
K-21/1

Your reference

Our reference

Date

Lt Col J Y Sanders
Defence Military & Air Attache
British Embassy
BAGHDAD



19 December 1974

Dear Col. Sanders,

(213)

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ

I am sorry I have not replied before this to your letter of 21 November. I have been away on a visit round the Middle East for about 2 or 3 weeks and have only recently returned. Even now I am afraid I will not be able to reply to your letter as fully as it deserves. I am being moved to another job on 1 January and am naturally spending quite a bit of time preparing the ground for Hugh Braden who will be my successor.

I hope therefore that you will not take it a miss if in this letter I give you my first off the cuff reactions to the points you put forward. I will make sure that Hugh Braden sees your letter and takes it into full consideration when he reviews the sale policy for each of the countries which will come under his control.

As I am sure you must be very tired hearing we in Defence Sales in London and you in Baghdad can only act within the policies laid down by the Foreign Office and their Ministers. It is no secret that during the last 6 or 7 months we in Defence Sales have found this constraint a very frustrating one. Sales prospects seem to abound and the customer has ready cash. You I know had the same feeling probably many times magnified but the situation was not only frustrating it was also potentially embarrassing. Where by Ministerial edict we could not agree to sell certain equipments we still tried to soften the blow either by playing the situation long or in some cases by leaving firms to continue unofficial discussions with Iraq. This policy has inevitably meant that there are a lot of loose ends but we and the Foreign Office felt it preferable to play it this way since there was always the possibility that at a later date when HMG approval became essential the Middle East situation might have changed sufficiently to allow us a more relaxed policy.

Your letter puts in question our whole attitude and it may well be that in the light of what you say we shall have to rethink our whole policy in this respect. I will certainly ask Hugh Braden who takes over on the 1 January to read your letter carefully and discuss it with the Foreign Office.

I am very sorry that up to now at least your time as Defence Attache in Baghdad has not been as fruitful as the prospects there would seem to promise. We in Defence Sales have tried to be helpful but we are very aware that at times it may not have seemed so seen from your end. It must of course remain true that Defence Sales cannot advance without continually glancing over its shoulder to make sure that it is still in step with the

general foreign policy considerations. This is particularly true in the Middle East where of course the situation is traditionally fluid. We also have to glance over our other shoulder within our own department to make sure that the security considerations are fully taken into account. I would hope however within these necessary constraints we try to be as flexible as possible.

In conclusion may I apologise again for what must I know seem to you a very inadequate reply to your full and interesting letter. But in the circumstances I am sure you will agree that it is more important that Hugh Braden takes the points you make on board. I would like also to thank you for your enthusiasm and assistance during the time we have worked together and wish you believe me the very best of luck in the future.


Yours sincerely,

Lansdowne

CONFIDENTIAL

(279)

Mr Weir ✓



252 THE IRAQ ARMED FORCES

I attach a draft reply to Mr Graham's letter of 10 December.
Defence Department concur with the line on training.

T J Clark
Middle East Department

19 December 1974

That is.

mm
up in

See reply at (281)

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Main Building Whitehall London SW1A 2HB

Telephone 01-218-6343

(28)

RECEIVED
NOV 35
- 6 JAN 75
NBR 101

FLS(A)

Your reference

AT1 (F&C)

Our reference D/DS6/50/23

Date 20 December 1974

The second 2 third sentences are not strong enough. Mr. Packer - Def D - has agreed to contact FLS etc 2 make the point
8/24/12

IRAQI REQUEST FOR TRAINING ATTACHMENTS

Reference:

- A. DA Baghdad DA/27 dated 5 December 1974. (copy attached for all except FLS(A) and Sy 2(A).)
- B. D/3840/FLS(A) dated 11 December 1974.

1. It seems evident to us from reference A that the Iraqi request is for training attachments rather than visits and we are accordingly passing it to AT1(F&C) for action.

2. The matter has been briefly discussed with the FCO: it is felt that no strong political case can be made for us to go out of way to meet the Iraqi request. This is not, however, necessarily to say that the request should be totally refused. We imagine that AT would observe the following guidelines:

- a. That only those attachments would be agreed which are unlikely to cause inconvenience.
- b. That only those attachments should be agreed which constitute an effective method of achieving the stated training aim, noting that this is seldom if ever possible when the attached student is of a high rank.
- c. Where there are other equally or more effective methods of achieving the aim, these should be offered in lieu of the attachments. Such methods might include:
 - (1) Courses which are not oversubscribed.
 - (2) Presentation of suitable training pamphlets/schools precis
 - (3) Attachments of less senior personnel.
- d. Security restrictions as appropriate.

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy to:

G Burton, Esq MED FCO ✓
Miss K Oliver, Def Dept., FCO
DS11

Sy 2(A) M02
MDS2
DAT Coord
AT 4b

M. Marsden
A T MARSDEN
Major
for Head of DS6



DEFENCE, MILITARY & AIR ATTACHES

BRITISH EMBASSY


BAGHDAD

c/o Foreign & Commonwealth Office
King Charles Street
London SW1

E 39

DA/27

FLS (A)
Ministry of Defence
Metropole Building
Northumberland Avenue
London WC2N 5BL



5th December 1974

ATTACHMENTS AND VISITS FOR IRAQI ARMY 1975

Reference:

A. DA/10 dated 15th October 1974.

S	N	INTLS	DATE
GSO I			
GSO III			
Capt GS			
RO III			
Clerks			

1. Attached at Annex A is a long list of requests for visits and attachments to British Army establishments from nearly all directorates in the Iraqi Ministry of Defence.
2. I was warned they were planning this by the Director of Military Training some two months ago and, I have accepted their request without commitment. I have had to re-write their original bid to make it more intelligible (I hope) but without changing their basic requirements.
3. I met the DCGS (Training) to try and anticipate some of your questions and to clarify a few of their vague requests.
4. There does not (surprisingly) seem to be any urgency in these bids and they said that they would like us to fit them in over the next six months at our convenience and to fit in with any demonstrations or exercises we may be planning.
5. The DCGS pointed out that these sort of visits used to be a regular feature of the relationship between our two armies especially in the period 1954-58. I did point out that times have changed since then.
6. Over the past eight months I have been subject to an almost constant barrage from the CGS, Commander of the Air Force, and virtually all of the senior Army officers I have met on the following theme.


"Although most of our equipment has over the past few years been coming from the Eastern bloc we have continued to train some of our officers in the UK. We continue using your tactics, and we have retained most of your customs, dress and traditions in our Army. There was a move especially after the 1973 War to move over to Eastern bloc tactics, but this has been strongly resisted. We have continued using your publications and we value your courses more than any other overseas courses. We are expanding our army considerably and we need to update our organisation, teaching and methods to bring ourselves in line with you".
7. Nothing I have seen or experienced from the Staff College, or Military College, to operational units in the North, contradicts this basic theme.

8. Under present conditions in Iraq a bid of this nature has clearly required the consent of the politicians and those in the services who I know are opposed to too big a reliance on the Soviet bloc, have obviously succeeded in their endeavours.

9. There is an almost childlike desire for a move in our direction, a recognition by us of their needs and a hope that we will respond in a positive manner.

10. If we can respond on most of these requests (EW excepted) there is also the strong possibility that these officers will also be looking for British Equipment. Although they have few illusions on what we will and will not sell them, there is enormous potential for defence sales here. They know we will not sell them armaments, tanks, bombers, artillery etc., but computers, radio, radar, ordnance handling eqpt, clothing, engineer stores and a wide range of other harmless non-offensive equipment which they can readily afford, is badly needed here.

11. Iraqs bids for courses next year has not been a great success. They have failed for the fourth year running to get a place at either the RAF or Army Staff College. Of 42 bids for oversubscribed courses, they have been given 8 vacancies. They have succeeded in obtaining one vacancy at Sandhurst, although they want 12 vacancies in the next two years. A series of attachments and visits would help to counter their lack of success in the course field.


J Y SANDERS
Lieutenant Colonel
Defence Attache

Copy to:

AT1 (F & C)
MOD Sales 1
FCO (Med)
(Def)

ATTACHMENTS AND VISITS TO BRITISH SCHOOLS AND UNITS REQUESTED BY IRAQ

Serial	Command/Directorate	Nominees			Aim	Period Requested	Remarks
		No	Rank	Appointment			
a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h
1	Special Forces Command	1	Lt Col	Bde HQ or Officer from Special Forces School	Attachment to Para Bde HQ and Parachute School	1 Month	
2		1	Officer	Doctor of Special Forces	Attachment to Para Units to see org and operation of Para Medical Units	2 Months	
3.	Directorate of Field Artillery	2	Capt and 1st Lt	Battery Comd Instructor (Gunnery)	Attachment to Fd Arty Unit and Visit to Arty School and see demos. Collect all latest publications/pamphlets etc to update their teaching	15 Days	
4.	Directorate of Infantry	2	Capt Maj	Instruction at Inf School	Visit all depts of School of Inf and Inf Bn to update themselves on all aspects of org tactics, methods of instruction and org of courses	2 weeks	

	b	c	d	e	f	g
5.	Directorate of Technical Equipment	1	Capt or Maj	Corps (eg New Iraqi Command HQ) or Engineer officer	1.Attachment to Corps or Div HQ to see org and method of operation of following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Corps HQ. b. Div HQ c. EW Units !? 2.Visit annual exhibitions for electronic machines and radio eqpt. 3.Attachment to Corps or Div HQ for exercises and demonstrations	
5.	Directorate of Signals	1	Capt	Signals Engineer Officer	1.Attachment to update on org and operation of following units. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a.Sig Regt Mech Inf Div b.Sig Regt Armd Div c.Sig Corps and School and centres. 2.Attachements to Exercises at Div or Corps level. 3.Visit factories producing signal tools and equipment.	No time period given.

a	b	c	d	e	f	g	h
7.	Directorate of Supplies and Transport	3	Capt Major Colonel	From the Directorate School and an Ordnance Unit	1. Visit training establishments relating to RCT and RAOC to: a. Update and familiarize themselves with org, operation, teaching methods etc. 2. Visit Corps/Div HQ to discuss all aspects of Supplies and Transport function.		Up to three weeks.
8.	Directorate of Military Engineering	4	Capt and above	Commander of Field Engr Unit and MOD Staff	Visit British Military Engineering Schools. Visit Bridging Units.	15 Days	
9.	Directorate of Ordnance	2	Brigadier	2IC Central Ordnance Depot and Directorate	Attachment to update knowledge of Central Ord Depots, Org, storage, stock control, records maintenance of arms, disposal methods etc.	3 Weeks	
10.	Directorate of Armour	2	Major Capt	Regt and Syn Comd	Attachment to a Tank Regt for a training period to view training methods, org, & exercises.	2 Weeks	
		2	Major Capt	Regt Comd and Supply Staff Officer	Visit Armour exhibition/demonstration/factories	2 Weeks.	


a.	b	c	d	e	f	g	h
11.	Directorate of Mechanical and Electrical Engineering	2	Brigadier Colonel	Commander of Vocational Centre and EME School	Attachment to EME unit & Div 9 Bde EME units to see org of EME, operation and liaison with units.	2 Weeks	
		2	Colonel Major	Directorate Staff and Base Workshop Commander	Attachment to Base or Field Workshop to see org and operation including annual production plan, overcoming difficulties relating to securing spare parts, management, safety, civil labour relations etc., etc.	2 Weeks	
		1	Capt or Lt	Commander of Repair Detachment	Attachment to Unit Repair Det for org and op relating to liaison with units, repair receiving methods, spare parts and methods of raising the standard of repair and maintenance in their own units.	2 Weeks	



Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1

Telephone 01-

CONFIDENTIAL



cc Deftend.

30-12-74

(281)

23/12
pa
23/12

J A N Graham Esq CMG
HM Ambassador
Baghdad.

Your reference

Our reference

Date 20 December 1974

THE IRAQ ARMED FORCES

252

1. Many thanks for your letter of 10 December reporting what was clearly a most useful call on General Shanshal.
2. I fear, as Geoffrey Arthur said in his letter of 12 December about arms sales, that the whole question of sales to Iraq together with military training in the UK is liable to be a regular source of problems which will test our bilateral relations to the utmost. I thought you took an admirable line on each of the three issues Shanshal raised, i.e. pamphlets, training and sales. I understand from the Ministry of Defence that the supply of pamphlets has increased, and we are certainly pushing for the Iraqis to be awarded as many places as possible on training courses. They will of course be frequently disappointed and frustrated since all courses are heavily over-subscribed, and even given our new-found relationship with the Iraqis and their enormous commercial potential it is difficult to recommend priority for Iraqi applications over those from traditionally more friendly nations. We shall continue to treat arms sales applications on their merits and you will have now seen that an export licence has been granted to EMI for Cymbeline. I hope by the time you receive this we shall have been able to telegraph to you a decision on the delivery dates for Cymbeline.
3. In the meantime I can only add that we are all very conscious of the temperature of the seat you occupy and that we will do our best to ensure that all Iraqi enquiries, even if the answer turns out to be negative, are dealt with as speedily as possible.

M S Weir

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CYPER CAT A


FROM MODUK

TO BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD

INFO FCO MED

CONFIDENTIAL

DIG EBR



FROM SALES 1B. DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ. RE YOUR 170615Z DEC.

1. COMBAT ENGINEER TRACTOR. CAN CONFIRM STILL UNDERGOING PROTOTYPE TRIALS. FOR YOUR INFO, ACCEPTANCE FOR BRITISH ARMY SERVICE EXPECTED JULY 1975. PRODUCTION LEAD TIME ABOUT TWO AND ONE HALF YEARS AND OUR FIRST DIVISION EXPECTED TO BE EQUIPED BY MAY 1978. YOU SHOULD APPRECIATE THAT PROVISION OF PRODUCTION STANDARD QUOTATION EVEN AT 1974 PRICES IS A COMPLEX TASK.

2. YOUR PARA 5. 25 PDR AMMO OBSOLETE (SEE SALES SUPPLY 1D SIGNAL 110900Z DEC). 4 POINT 2 INCH MORTAR AMMO AND 75MM AMMO BOTH USA MANUFACTURE. AP MINES, MINE AND BOOBY TRAP ACCESSORIES, TRACKED APC AND SCORPION FALL INTO QUOTE NOT CLEAR CUT UNQUOTE CATEGORY.

3. YOUR PARA 6 REFERS. ALPHA. SUCH A TANK DOES NOT EXIST. WORLD WAR TWO FLAIL TANK RENDERED OBSOLETE SEVERAL DECADES AGO BY DOUBLE IMPULSE FUSE. THIS WAS EXPLAINED TO COL ABDUL. BRAVO. NO KNOWN ALTERNATIVES TO VIPERS. POSITION AS STATED IN OUR 060930Z AUG. CHARLIE. POSITION IS AS STATED IN OUR 031310 AND 070944Z OCT IE MINELAYER NOT FOR SALE TO IRAQ AND MINE EXPLODER OBSOLETE. DELTA. WHEN COL ABDUL WAS IN UK HE WAS TOLD NOTHING AVAILABLE TO MEET HIS PARTICULAR REQUIREMENTS. THIS IS TRUE, HOWEVER AM NOW CHECKING ON COMMERCIAL DEVICE WHICH MIGHT BE OF INTEREST TO HIM. WILL ADVISE FURTHER IN DUE COURSE. GRATEFUL YOU SAY NOTHING YET.

4. YOUR PARA 8. PREMATURE TO TALK OF CONTRACTS. VALUE OF OFFERS REPEAT OFFERS AS FOLLOWS. AIRFIELD LANDING MAT 6 POINT 4 MILLION STERLING. LAIRD TRACKWAY QUARTER MILLION STERLING APPROX. SCOTTISH AVIATION GAVE ONLY AN INDICATIVE PRICE UPDATE ON THEIR MAY 74 QUOTATION, VALUE OF OFFER FOR 9 ARMED BULLDOG COULD BE IN ORDER OF FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND STERLING DEPENDING ON WHAT IAF ASK FOR. BRITTEN NORMAN SAY THEY ONLY SUBMITTED OUTLINE PROPOSALS AS PART OF EXPLORATORY OPERATION IN MARKETING DEFENDER. OFFER WAS FOR VARIOUS QUANTITIES. FIRM NOT PREPARED TO INDICATE POSSIBLE VALUE AT THIS EARLY STAGE.

5. D SALES 1 REPLYING TO YOUR DA/31 LETTER SHORTLY

FILES

MED

DEF. ID

MR WEIR

CONFIDENTIAL

VV

R L

156 23/2155 357A3212

FOR DFA

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY NO 35

-6 JAN 1975

(28)

ROUTINE/ROUTINE 231535Z DEC

FROM MODUK

TO BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD

INFO FCO MED

NBR 10/1

NO DISTRIBUTION

R E S T R I C T E D

DIG WWW/EBR

MED

FROM SALES 1B. R.E. DEMO 75. THANK YOU FOR YOUR PROMPT
REPLY 190900Z DEC, HOWEVER AFTER SEEING YOUR LIST OF HIGH
RANKING OFFICERS HAVE SOUGHT FURTHER ADVICE RE ADVISABILITY
OF INVITING IRAQIS. IRAQIS WOULD SEE MANY ITEMS WE COULD
NOT SUPPLY AND EVEN THOUGH THIS A NON SALES DEMO CAN FORE-
SEE THEM ASKING EMBARRASSING QUESTIONS. MUST REGRET
THEREFORE WE PREFER TO LEAVE IRAQ OFF OUR LIST THIS TIME
AROUND.

BT

M. B. 24/12
J. 1/12

FOR DPA
ROUTINE/ROUTINE 231535Z DEC

REGISTRY NO 35

-6 JAN 1975

(28)

FROM MODUK
TO BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD
INFO FCO MED

NBR 10/1

NO-DISTRIBUTION

R E S T R I C T E D
DIG WWW/EBR

MED

FROM SALES 1B. R.E. DEMO 75. THANK YOU FOR YOUR PROMPT
REPLY 190900Z DEC, HOWEVER AFTER SEEING YOUR LIST OF HIGH
RANKING OFFICERS HAVE SOUGHT FURTHER ADVICE RE ADVISABILITY
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SEE THEM ASKING EMBARRASSING QUESTIONS. MUST REGRET
THEREFORE WE PREFER TO LEAVE IRAQ OFF OUR LIST THIS TIME
AROUND.

~~BT~~

M. B. 24/12
J. 1/12

NNNNK
VV

CONFIDENTIAL

DFA155 23/2150 357A3202

FOR DFA

ROUTINE/ROUTINE 231321Z DEC

FROM MODUK
TO BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD
INFO FCO MED

RECEIVED IN
REGISTER N 35
-6 JAN 1975
NBR 101

MOD DISTRIBUTION

CONFIDENTIAL
DIG EBR

FROM SALES 1B. IRAQ NAVY. RE YOUR 170645Z DEC.

1. BRITISH HOVERCRAFT CORP HAVE BEEN ADVISED OF IRAQS
INTEREST IN HOVERCRAFT AND ARE NOW CONSIDERING THEIR
RESPONSE BEARING IN MIND THEIR COMMITMENTS TO KUWAIT AND
IRAN.

2. ARRANGING FOR ADDITIONAL COPIES OF BDEC TO BE SENT TO
YOU FOR DISTRIBUTION TO IRAQIS. THIS SHOULD ALLOW THEM
TO MAKE DIRECT CONTACT WITH MANUFACTURERS OF OTHER
NAVAL EQUIPMENT.

BT

(284)

Mr. Bush 24/12

W. Raftery to see 24/12

MR

(285)

TOP COPY

IMMEDIATE
CYPHER/CAT A

RESTRICTED

IMMEDIATE/IMMEDIATE 241035Z DEC

FROM MODUK PE
TO BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD
INFO FCO LONDON

11276

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 -6 JAN 1975 MBR 10/1
--

R E S T R I C T E D

DIG EBR

FROM SALES 1B/SS. D/SALES/113/48/1. FCO FOR MED, DEPT OF TRADE
EXPORT LICENSING BRANCH. CYMBELINE.

FURTHER TO MY 191645Z DEC. EXPORT LICENCE WILL BE ISSUED ON MONDAY
30 DECEMBER 1974. DECISIONS ON IMPROVED DELIVERY AND EARLY TRAINING
STILL AWAITED. EMI PREPARED TO COME OUT TO PRESERVE CUSTOMER
RELATIONS BUT SEE LITTLE POINT UNTIL DELIVERY POSITION CLEARER.
PLEASE ADVISE WHETHER EMI SHOULD SEND REP BEFORE THIS HAS BEEN
RESOLVED. IF SO, WHAT DO IRAQIS WISH TO DISCUSS, BEARING IN MIND
EMI UNABLE TO TALK ABOUT BRITISH ARMY TRNG ? IRAQI MA LONDON HAS
NOT REPEAT NOT ASKED FOR EMI TO GO OUT.

BT

[COPIES SENT TO DOT, EXPORT LICENSING BRANCH]

FILES:
MED
DEFENCE DEPT

RESTRICTED

889/E 036/28

LKS 653/28

MODUK

GRS 80

CYPHER CAT A

FM BAGHDAD 280825Z DEC

SECRET

TO ROUTINE MODUK TELNO 280815Z DEC.

DIG EDQ

FROM DA FOR MD/HDS.

HOT ATGW. SALE TO IRAQ.

YOUR EDQ 061649Z REFERS.

MOD DISTRIBUTION

1. RUMOURS OF SALE CIRCULATING HERE BUT NOT CONFIRMED.
2. FRENCH MA SAYS IRAQIS HAVE ASKED FOR THEM BUT NO CONTRACT SIGNED YET.
3. HE SAYS HOT STILL UNDER FRENCH ARMY TRIALS AND UNLIKELY TO BE ACCEPTED AND DELIVERED TO FRENCH ARMY BEFORE 1976.

GRAHAM

BT

NNNN

RECEIVED IN
REGISTRY NO 35
-6 JAN 1975

(286)

begin what
HOT ATGW
NB R101
31/X11

Mr. Williams
ji 30/12

MED

(287)



DEFENCE, MILITARY & AIR ATTACHÉS
BRITISH EMBASSY
BAGHDAD

c/o Foreign & Commonwealth Office
King Charles Street
London SW1

Enter
W. Burton
2
21

DA/34/2


Sales 1b
Ministry of Defence
Stuart House
23-25 Soho Square
London W1V 5FJ

29th December 1974

ROYAL ENGINEERS DEMONSTRATION
8-10 JULY 1975

Reference:

- A. Your Tel 170848Z Dec.
- B. My Tel OYX 190900Z Dec.
- C. Your Tel WWV/EBR 231535Z Dec.



1. In Reference A you asked me for a list of suitable Iraqi Army Officers MOD might possibly invite to this demonstration.
2. In Reference B I submitted a list of officers to whom invitations might be sent, pointed out that sales would almost inevitably follow and referred to a letter sent to FLS(A) which contained details of a large list of requests for visits to UK military establishments by the Iraqi Army. I felt that an invitation to this demonstration would be appreciated by the Engineering Branch who had already asked for such a visit to be arranged.
3. I agree that the list of officers contained a high proportion of high ranking officers. Sending invitations to them would be more of a diplomatic exercise rather than a practical proposition, and it would be most unlikely that they would in fact go to the demonstration. However the gesture would have been appreciated by them and they would have then made sure that Iraq was represented by middle rank Engineering Officers. At a guess I would think that Colonel Abdul Karen, possibly the Commandant of the School of Engineering, a Regimental Commander and one or two Staff Officers from the Party would eventually comprise the delegation and even then it would be a last minute decision on who went.
4. As you say in Reference C the Iraqis would see items we could not supply them but equally they would also see items which we could supply them with, and would be happy to do so to the advantage of our balance of payments.
5. Presumably if we had taken the line of not showing them things for fear of embarrassing questions we would not now have signed a JRM contract for MGB or be discussing the future supply of Combat Engineer Tractors, Airfield Landing Mats at £5.4M or Laird Tracking at £1M.



6. Both the Ambassador and I feel it is much better to adopt a more open forthright attitude with the Iraqis which will involve saying no occasionally than the somewhat devious time consuming line we seem to be taking at the moment.
7. Would you please therefore reconsider your decision not to invite the Iraqis to this demonstration.

J Y Sanders
J Y SANDERS
Lieutenant Colonel
Defense Attache

Copy to:

HDS 1b
Ministry of Defence
96 Whitehall
London SW1

FCO - MED
Def Dept.

(288)

VV

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-6 JAN 1975
NBR 10/1

PRIORITY

DFA124 30/1811 364A2449

FOR DFA

PRIORITY/ROUTINE 301520Z DEC

FROM MODUK
TO BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD
INFO FCO MED

~~NO DISTRIBUTION~~

R129
Jefence 942)

RESTRICTED
DIG EBR

FROM SALES 1B PD CYMBELINE PD RE YOUR 300500Z PD EXPORT
LICENCE ISSUED TODAY PD EMI HAVE PROVIDED IRAQI MA LONDON WITH
ALL NECESSARY DOCUMENTATION AND HAVE REQUESTED ADVANCE PAYMENT
DUE TO THEM PD EMI NOTE POSITION RE SENDING REP
BT

GRS 250/3

PRIORITY

EN CLAIR

FM BAGHDAD 300500Z DEC

UNCLASSIFIED

TOP COPY


(289)

TO IMMEDIATE MODUK TELNO 300500Z DEC/1974 INFO PRIORITY FCO AND
DTI LONDON (FOR EXPORT LICENCING BRANCH)

DIG EBR

FROM DA FOR SALES 1B

CYMBELINE



YOUR EBR 241035Z DEC REFERS.

1. I SPOKE TO DIRECTOR ARMAMENTS AND SUPPLIES THIS MORNING.
2. AGREES NO POINT IN EMI REP COMING TO BAGHDAD BEFORE DECISION ON IMPROVED DELIVERY MADE.
3. HOPES EMI CONFORMS TO CONTRACT ON 30 DEC WHEN EXPORT LICENCE ISSUED AND THEY REQUIRE NOTIFICATION FROM EMI OF GRANTING OF EXPORT LICENCE PLUS BANK GUARANTEE TO ENABLE THEM TO MAKE ADVANCE PAYMENT OF LETTER OF CREDIT.
4. IF DELIVERY DATE AND ALL TRAINING ARRANGEMENTS ARE BROUGHT FORWARD TO JUNE/JULY 75 THEY WILL NOT NEED TO SEE EMI REP.
5. IF DELIVERY DATE AND EMI TRAINING ONLY BROUGHT FORWARD THEY WILL WANT TO SEE EMI REP TO DISCUSS FURTHER TRAINING.

GRAHAM

FILES
MED
DEF D
MR WEIR
MR THOMSON

COPIES TO
EXPORT LICENCING BRANCH DOT

PRODROME LONDON

PROCEXECSTU LDN

'IMMEDIATE'

UU

00 RBDWCAH

DE RBDTPL

ZNR UUUUU

O 301214Z DEC

FM MODUK PE

TO RBDWCAH/BRITDEF BAGHDAD

INFO ZEN/FCO LONDON

BT

UNCLAS

DIG WWW/EBR

FROM SALES 1B/SS FOR FAIREY. FCO FOR MED. RE YOUR 300515Z DEC.

DIFFICULTY IN ISSUING VISA TO BIRD WHO IS IN GERMAN FEDERAL

REPUBLIC AT PRESENT. HE MAY WISH TO TRAVEL DIRECT TO BAGHDAD. IF

SO COULD VISA BE ISSUED ON HIS ARRIVAL IN BAGHDAD.

BT

NNNN

PRODROME LONDON



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VV

R E S T R I C T E D

Defence

~~DFA092 31/1341 365A1139~~

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(MED) ←

FOR DFA

ROUTINE/ROUTINE 310830Z DEC

FROM MODUK
TO BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD
INFO FCO MED

CYPHER

R E S T R I C T E D

DIG EBR

FROM SALES1B PD SA19 EXPLOSIVES DETECTOR PD SPOKE TO FIRM
WHO SAY THEY ALREADY SUPPLIED THREE IN AUG THIS YEAR AGAINST
IRAQI MOD CONTRACT 4221 15 AUG PD DIRECTOR OF CONTRACTS AND
PURCHASES PURCHASE NO CONT/74/DME/43/CONT/825 REFERS PDSUGGEST
YOU ADVISE DIRECTOR ARMAMENTS AND SUPPLIES SPEAKS TO HIS
OPPOSITE NUMBER IN CONTRACTS
BT

1343

R E S T R I C T E D

NNNN

(292)

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RESTRICTED

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE/ROUTINE 310945Z DEC

FROM MODUK
TO BRITDEFAT BAGHDAD
INFO FCO MED

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No 35 -6 JAN 1975 NR 10/1

R E S T R I C T E D

DIG EBR

FROM SALES 1B. MGB. RE YOUR 300515 AND OUR 301214Z DEC.
GRATEFUL YOU PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM FAIREY TO IRAQ
MOD. QUOTE. FAIREY ENGINEERING ARE SURPRISED TO LEARN
THAT THERE IS CONCERN OVER PRICE OF EQUIPMENT IN VIEW OF
FACT THAT IT WAS NEGOTIATED AND SIGNED BY DELEGATION IN
UK. FAIREY ENGINEERING HAVE ALREADY COMMITTED CONSIDERABLE
FINANCE FOR PROCUREMENT OF MATERIALS IN ORDER TO MEET
VERY EARLY DELIVERY DATES. HOWEVER, AS PREVIOUSLY OFFERED,
REPRESENTATIVES ARE PREPARED TO VISIT FOR DISCUSSIONS IF
REQUIRED AND COULD LEAVE UK ABOUT 4 JANUARY PROVIDED VISAS
AND FLIGHTS AVAILABLE. UNQUOTE. GRATEFUL FOR URGENT
RESPONSE.

F I L E S

MED
DEFENCE D
MR THOMSON
MR CAMPBELL


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Treasury Chambers
Parliament Street London SW1P 3AG

Telex 262405

Telephone 01-930 1234 ext



J W Pannell Esq
Export Credits Guarantee Department
Aldermanbury House
Aldermanbury
LONDON EC2P 2EL

Your reference
SP/A/44401/8167
Our reference
2F(E) 17/180/01
Date
3/ December 1974


MOBILE RUNWAY FOR IRAQ

Thank you for your letter of 17 December about the Revised proposition from Fairey Engineering. I note that the contract value is now estimated at £6.4m.

As indicated earlier in the year we have no objections to the proposed transaction and that this business may be related to the section II arms account.

A SCOTT

cc G M Lambert B/E
S N Chilton DOT
T J Wilshire ODM
R G Marlow FCO
R J Sanders MOD



DEFENCE, MILITARY & AIR ATTACHES
BRITISH EMBASSY
BAGHDAD



E + VA
R 21/1

DA/31

Director of Sales 1
Ministry of Defence
Stuart House
23/25 Soho Square
London W1V 5FJ

17th December 1974

Dear Director (HRB)

DEFENCE SALES TO IRAQ

1. As I do as yet not know who has taken over from Peter Britain in Sales 1b I am writing direct to you. I have in the past written periodic letters to bring you up to date on what is going on out here in the Defence Sales field. As a great deal has happened in the last few weeks I thought it was about time that I wrote you another letter, bringing you up to date with what I know at this end. I would very much appreciate a similar letter from your end, and a re-establishment of contact on a DO basis with whoever has taken over from Peter Britain. I would also appreciate some reaction to my letter DA/31 of 21st November to Ian McDonald on the general question of Defence Sales to Iraq. A copy of this letter also went to FCO with a covering letter from my Ambassador.

25 Pounder Gun, Spare Parts and Shells

2. I still have no answer on whether we can supply spare parts for the 25 Pounder Gun supplied by us to Iraq, or not. This is becoming rather embarrassing as I am about to go for the third time to the Ministry of Defence in six weeks on this particular subject, and am still unable to give them an answer. On the question of Smoke Shells, I will be getting the answer tomorrow and will signal Iraq's detailed requirements. One last point, a signal OYP/LPE of 110900Z December was sent from Sales 1b Miller for Graham. Mr Graham is the Ambassador here and as you know all telegrams have his name at the end. If a particular telegram is for me it is not customary to make it personal for the Ambassador.

Defence Sales Catalogue

3. The Iraqis have been pressing me for some time for more copies of the Defence Sales Catalogue. They already have copies of this years edition and it seems rather senseless to with hold further copies (your EBR/LPE 191405Z November). May I please have six more copies to distribute to those in the Iraqi Ministry of Defence who have been demanding it, including a copy for the Iraqi Navy.

HOT Anti Tank Guided Weapon

4. Head of Defence Sales asked me if I could confirm whether Aerospatiale

LAST PAPER

10 DEC 1974

has supplied 4,000 HOT Missiles and 50 Launchers to Iraq. I am unable at this stage to confirm this information but in view of the recent supplies arriving from France I would think it more than likely that they are giving them these Missiles. As soon as I have confirmation I will signal.

20 Ton Vehicles with 20 Ton Trailers

5. Iraq MOD require 200 of these vehicles and I have sent two telegrams on this subject without any response. Can you let me know whether there is a British Company which can supply the Iraqis with these vehicles.

Engineer Equipment

6. I was very pleased to see the Iraqis had signed the £9M contract for the MGB equipment from Faireys. My recent spate of signals on this subject contain a lot of queries on the other equipment they asked for, for which we have as yet not had any satisfactory replies. I don't mind telling them they can't have the more difficult equipment, what is unsatisfactory is, hanging in a limbo and not knowing whether to say yes or no. Sales 1b telegram EBR/LPE undated which gave a report of the visit of the Engineer Officers, was particularly vague in giving me details of the equipment the Iraqis had asked for which was either obsolete, or of foreign origin, or other equipment where the position was not clear. When I was called to the Ministry of Defence by Colonel Abdul Karim, I was so badly briefed that I was unable to answer any of his questions. When an Iraqi delegation returns from UK to Iraq and has been escorted by MDS my I have a fuller report, so that I am properly briefed should I be called to MOD to answer questions.

Hawker Siddeley V182 Hawk Trainer

7. I have already reported the visit of a Mr. Brown and Mr. Johnson my letter DA/31/6 of 9th December 1974. They are now presumably preparing a contract for either 40 Trainers at £55M or 60 Trainers at £75M. The Iraqis did not seem in any way perturbed at a delivery date of 1977 and I only hope there will not be any objections to this delivery time in London.

Cymbeline

8. This saga seems to have dragged on for most of the year, and we were very pleased to see the delivery date brought forward to October 1975. We have subsequently asked for this to be brought forward another three months, but have as yet no answer. Have you any news?

British Leyland

9. Mr. Stowell and Mr. Adams came in in mid November to discuss any order for 500 109 Landrovers for the Palace, and another order for 150 Rangerovers for the Palace. Unfortunately due to the death of the President's wife they were unable to see anyone to discuss the contract. However they will be returning shortly to discuss this request and another request from the Army for 1,000 109 Landrovers, a quantity of 10 seater Station Wagons, 200 109 Landrovers, 50 88 Landrovers and 50 Ambulances for the Air Force.

Tank Transporters

10. Both British Leyland and Rolls Royce have been in Baghdad on this subject. We were approached in early 1973 for a quantity of some 400 Tank transporters and having blocked this sale we believe Fohn of Germany have got the contract. However things seem to have gone sour and we believe that the Deutsche Engines in these transporters are unsatisfactory and the Iraqis may have cancelled the contract. In which case we are hopefully back in the market, that is if a sale of this nature is agreed in London.

Roll Royce

11. Apart from being interested in either providing engines for British tank transporters or replacing the Deutche engines in the Fohn transporters. Mr. Doug Peters of Rolls Royce Aircraft Engines has been in Baghdad trying to get back the servicing of the Hunter/Avon engines which they used to do for Iraq. This contract was taken over by the Indians but there is every reason to believe that it will be in Iraq's interest for Rolls Royce to get the contract back again. I don't know whether Mr. Peters was successful or not as he left Baghdad without seeing me again but I believe he is coming back in early January to see the Iraqi Air Force again. He was also here to see about the Spay/Dart engines which they have in the Trident Aircraft they have supplied to Iraq.

Scottish Aviation

12. I understand they made an offer to the Iraqis for the supply of Bulldog aircraft but the Iraqis did not respond in time and a revised contract has now been sent to the Air Force with increased prices for them to consider. Have you any other information on the value of this contract or the quantity of Bulldog aircraft involved.

Britten-Norman

13. The Iraqis have been very wary of this firm as you may remember they went bankrupt and failed to complete a contract they had with the Iraqi Air Force. Mr. Paul of Britten-Norman came out earlier this year and sorted out the problems and after a further Iraqi Air Force request they now say they can supply four Defenders for delivery in March 1975. They are now waiting a contract from Britten-Norman for this particular deal.

Ryland Group

14. Mr. Wallwork has just been out to sign a contract for £5,000 (small fry) for a Vehicle Servicing Unit for the Ministry of Defence.

Singer's Link Trainers

15. Mr. Dunford of the Link-Miles Division of Singer has also been out to see the Iraqi Services requirements for Simulators for aircraft, helicopters, tanks, gunnery and navigation and ship handling. There is undoubtedly a very big market for this equipment here and he will be returning in January to pursue contracts.

16. All this I suspect is the tip of an iceberg and I am only reporting on those individuals who have come to see me. I know there are a large number of businessmen who never come near the Embassy and one only hears of contracts if and when export licences are required. For instance the Director of Ordnance Services told me the other day that he had just received 50,000 tin hats from a British company and required a further 50,000. The encouraging point is that the Iraqis tend to be taking me more and more into their confidence and by doing this I am in some cases able to give you early warning of their requirements. I would be most grateful if you could collate all the information you have on Sales to Iraq and let me know the position.

*Yours sincerely
John Sanders*

Defence Sales To Iraq; Iraqi Request For Training Attachments; Arms Working Party Clearances. UK Arms Sales To Iraq. 12 Nov. 1974. MS Middle East Online: Iraq, 1914-1974: Selected files from series AIR, CAB, CO, FCO, FO, PREM, T, WO, The National Archives, Kew, UK FCO 8/2323. The National Archives (Kew, United Kingdom). Archives Unbound, link.gale.com/apps/doc/SC5107473130/GDSC?u=webdemo&sid=bookmark-GDSC&xid=beafd6a2&pg=1. Accessed 11 Apr. 2022.